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Persistence of Bounded Rationality in Financial Markets: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Model — arXiv:2610.39198

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39198
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-31T06:22:24.167Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
8ee34ea0704b9b49c7347c6c3da168fea47d026ffacd5178cd5e2fef25338f59
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c411edefe72e

How to cite

Persistence of Bounded Rationality in Financial Markets: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Model — arXiv:2610.39198 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39198 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c411edefe72e (Metraipolis archive dc_c411edefe72e, sha256 8ee34ea0704b9b49c7347c6c3da168fea47d026ffacd5178cd5e2fef25338f59)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc411edefe72e,
  title = {Persistence of Bounded Rationality in Financial Markets: An Evolutionary Game-Theoretic Model — arXiv:2610.39198},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39198},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c411edefe72e; sha256 8ee34ea0704b9b49c7347c6c3da168fea47d026ffacd5178cd5e2fef25338f59},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39198. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Classical theory predicts that irrational traders lose money to rational traders and are eventually driven out of the market. Yet noise trading, herding, and heuristic trading persist even in highly developed markets. We model a financial market as an ecology of two trading-behavior types, relatively rational (R) and boundedly rational (N), whose composition evolves under replicator dynamics according to relative performance. Each type's fitness depends on the share of the other type and on frictions. When the interaction is complementary, that is, rational traders profit from the mispricing created by boundedly rational traders while the latter benefit from the liquidity and price correction supplied by the former, and when the difference in frictions is moderate, a unique interior composition exists and is globally asymptotically stable: bounded rationality persists endogenously. When the interaction is antagonistic, the same point becomes a tipping threshold between two one-type regimes. Comparative statics show that lowering the costs of disciplined trading, as algorithmic and AI-based trading does, shifts the composition toward rational trading continuously but does not eliminate bounded rationality unless the cost advantage exceeds an explicit threshold.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH); General Finance (q-fin.GN).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.39198 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-31T06:08:53.364Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).