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Rigid-Covert GNSS Spoofing of UAV Swarms: A Structural Blind Spot, Its Detection Limit, and Absolute-Anchor Defenses — arXiv:2608.06885
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- arXiv (en)
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- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06885
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-19T09:52:58.369Z
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Rigid-Covert GNSS Spoofing of UAV Swarms: A Structural Blind Spot, Its Detection Limit, and Absolute-Anchor Defenses — arXiv:2608.06885 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06885 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c343e2ca1737 (Metraipolis archive dc_c343e2ca1737, sha256 4f84c239e33de757489da4efdd60a015742974723248f6d486bdd2347b15db24)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc343e2ca1737,
title = {Rigid-Covert GNSS Spoofing of UAV Swarms: A Structural Blind Spot, Its Detection Limit, and Absolute-Anchor Defenses — arXiv:2608.06885},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06885},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c343e2ca1737; sha256 4f84c239e33de757489da4efdd60a015742974723248f6d486bdd2347b15db24},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06885. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Cooperative UAV-swarm defenses commonly cross-check GNSS positions against measured inter-drone geometry. We show that this relative-geometry channel has a structural blind spot: a common, slowly varying translation (a rigid-covert shift, RigidShift) preserves all pairwise distances and is therefore unobservable to any relative-only detector (a gauge-freedom argument). We validate this blindness on distance-verification and semidefinite-feasibility baselines, while explicitly distinguishing it from onboard inertial/GNSS monitors that can raise a bare alarm but cannot recover the swarm's true position. To quantify when an external reference restores observability, we derive the drift-dependent detection floor $2\gamma/(1-t_s/T)$ for a calibrated anchor-residual detector and empirically identify an additional detector-specific noise floor (measured slope 2.66 vs. predicted 2.67). We then present a centralized anchor-rooted recovery pipeline that reconstructs swarm geometry from inter-drone ranges, aligns it to a trusted-anchor subset with Byzantine-robust fitting, and recovers the absolute positions of non-anchored drones. A segmented estimator jointly estimates anchor drift, attack rate, and onset when no clean-epoch label is available. Across statistical simulations, ArduPilot software-in-the-loop experiments, and Gazebo experiments with rendered vision anchors, the method recovers the positions of non-anchored drones to a median error of 0.39 m (20 seeds) under approximately 10.1 m of GNSS drift, and to 7.1 cm (5 seeds) in the rendered-vision multi-SITL setting. We also characterize the explicit limits imposed by non-collinear anchor geometry, anchor coverage, $\tau\to0$ drift-attack aliasing, and majority anchor compromise. All evaluations are simulation-based and use no RF spoofing hardware or physical swarm. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-10 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Robotics (cs.RO). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06885 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-19T09:51:05.644Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-08-10?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).