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SpecTrum: Specification-Guided Differential Fuzzing for Ethereum Consensus Clients — arXiv:2608.17738

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.17738
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T14:55:30.031Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
1c3d1cb79a283a5d8494f6ebf939733be337e798fd8101a334aa7e76c279cc38
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c26c46ff1ea2

How to cite

SpecTrum: Specification-Guided Differential Fuzzing for Ethereum Consensus Clients — arXiv:2608.17738 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.17738 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c26c46ff1ea2 (Metraipolis archive dc_c26c46ff1ea2, sha256 1c3d1cb79a283a5d8494f6ebf939733be337e798fd8101a334aa7e76c279cc38)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc26c46ff1ea2,
  title = {SpecTrum: Specification-Guided Differential Fuzzing for Ethereum Consensus Clients — arXiv:2608.17738},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.17738},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c26c46ff1ea2; sha256 1c3d1cb79a283a5d8494f6ebf939733be337e798fd8101a334aa7e76c279cc38},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.17738. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Ethereum's consensus safety relies on independent consensus client implementations agreeing on every state transition. When they diverge due to implementation errors, the network can fork, finality can stall, and severe attacks are possible. To prevent such consensus divergences, Ethereum provides a Python reference implementation (consensus-spec), which acts as a specification, and a hand-crafted official test suite (spectests). However, as an executable implementation, Ethereum's specification defines validity implicitly through runtime behavior. As a result, it lacks a systematic way to ensure that all validity conditions are thoroughly evaluated. We present SpecTrum, a framework that addresses this problem in three stages. First, we introduce Consensus-SpecTec, a mechanized specification of the Ethereum consensus algorithm, which makes validity conditions explicit as if-premises. Second, we define premise coverage, a metric that measures which if-premises are evaluated to true and false across spectests. Third, we develop a specification-based test generator that extracts constraints on premises not evaluated to false by spectests and generates inputs to evaluate them. Applying SpecTrum to five major Ethereum consensus clients, we identify 27 cross-client divergence cases, 22 of which cannot be found without the premises inserted in our mechanization. All 27 cases reproduce across fork versions, and extending the mechanized specification to a new fork takes modest effort proportional to the specification difference.

Tema degli esploratori: calcolo e infrastrutture (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-19 in cs.SE).
Categorie arXiv: Software Engineering (cs.SE) ; Cryptography and Security (cs.CR); Programming Languages (cs.PL).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.17738 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T14:48:24.135Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.SE/2026-08-19?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).