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Accelerating QUIC Encryption in WebAssembly Using WASM-SIMD — arXiv:2611.01989

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01989
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T18:33:05.847Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
0ca0d16b5c4219087c449a2c08423b896b82cc82c092c17512e26e9a65d0cda6
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c26280b88959

How to cite

Accelerating QUIC Encryption in WebAssembly Using WASM-SIMD — arXiv:2611.01989 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01989 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c26280b88959 (Metraipolis archive dc_c26280b88959, sha256 0ca0d16b5c4219087c449a2c08423b896b82cc82c092c17512e26e9a65d0cda6)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc26280b88959,
  title = {Accelerating QUIC Encryption in WebAssembly Using WASM-SIMD — arXiv:2611.01989},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01989},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c26280b88959; sha256 0ca0d16b5c4219087c449a2c08423b896b82cc82c092c17512e26e9a65d0cda6},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01989. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

WebAssembly (Wasm) runs untrusted code in a portable, lightweight sandbox and is increasingly used to host services on shared servers and edge platforms. Running the QUIC transport protocol inside Wasm would let each application choose and update its own transport without changing the host. QUIC, however, encrypts every packet, and Wasm offers neither dedicated AES instructions nor carry-less multiplication; a Wasm QUIC stack has been reported to reach only 17.6% of native goodput, with cryptography as its largest cost. Whether the 128-bit SIMD extension of Wasm (WASM-SIMD) can recover this cost, and what limits a pure-Wasm stack once it does, has remained unclear. Here we show that explicit WASM-SIMD kernels recover much of the cryptographic cost, after which non-cryptographic costs become the limit. On two hosts connected by 10-Gigabit Ethernet, kernels that process eight AES blocks or four ChaCha20 blocks per pass raise receiver goodput over a non-SIMD baseline by 61.34% for AES-128-GCM and 31.55% for ChaCha20-Poly1305, whereas compiler auto-vectorization gains only 1.28% for AES-128-GCM. ChaCha20-Poly1305 still delivers 1.99 times the goodput of AES-128-GCM, confirming end to end the preference that stand-alone cipher benchmarks suggest. Receiver-side profiling combined with Amdahl's law predicts that even native-speed cryptography would leave Wasm at roughly one third of the goodput of the fastest native stack. Cryptographic acceleration is therefore necessary but not sufficient: memory allocation, runtime overhead and per-datagram UDP I/O now bound pure-Wasm transports. We anticipate that this per-category cost breakdown will guide further optimization of Wasm network stacks and the design of system interfaces for batched I/O.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.01989 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T18:12:23.794Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).