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RemTraceNet: Few-Shot Forensic Detection of Invisible Watermark Attacks — arXiv:2609.31694

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31694
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T22:34:59.624Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
003898e3768fbfaf24a654a6e62634a76793455cea5dc2018da5917fccf2c14a
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c17101ffc25c

How to cite

RemTraceNet: Few-Shot Forensic Detection of Invisible Watermark Attacks — arXiv:2609.31694 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31694 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c17101ffc25c (Metraipolis archive dc_c17101ffc25c, sha256 003898e3768fbfaf24a654a6e62634a76793455cea5dc2018da5917fccf2c14a)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc17101ffc25c,
  title = {RemTraceNet: Few-Shot Forensic Detection of Invisible Watermark Attacks — arXiv:2609.31694},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31694},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c17101ffc25c; sha256 003898e3768fbfaf24a654a6e62634a76793455cea5dc2018da5917fccf2c14a},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31694. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Removing an invisible watermark and concealing the forensic evidence are distinct objectives: successfully disrupting the embedded watermark does not imply that the removal process is forensically undetectable. When verification fails, removal traces can provide complementary evidence for provenance and ownership verification, whereas their absence leaves the cause of the failure ambiguous. Existing methods are typically evaluated by watermark suppression and perceptual quality, while forensic stealth is rarely considered. We therefore study watermark-attack-specific few-shot forensics: for each known pipeline, a specialist can separate its outputs from paired clean and unattacked watermarked controls. Separate Attack-vs-Clean and Attack-vs-Watermarked evaluations prevent watermark-presence shortcuts. Image-aligned and prompt-matched controls are used for post-hoc and generator-integrated schemes, respectively. In this work, we introduce RemTraceNet, which fuses constrained residuals, local relations, FFT/Haar statistics, and block-DCT evidence at native resolution. Across 23 removal pipelines and 10 watermark configurations, we evaluate native 256 x 256 and 512 x 512 inputs. With 100 attacked training images per pipeline, the three-seed TPR@1%FPR, macro-averaged over attacks and watermark configurations, ranges from 82.75% to 88.17% across resolutions and control types. Under the condition of same labels and protocol, RemTraceNet outperforms retrained SRNet, ZhuNet, and SiaStegNet baselines by 10.80--15.68 percentage points. Extensive experimental results show that erasing a watermark and erasing evidence of its removal are distinct challenges, and that removal traces remain learnable under limited supervision.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-29 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV) ; Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.31694 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T22:13:03.757Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-29?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).