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PDoS: A Profitable Denial-of-Service Attack against Proof-of-Work Blockchain Liveness — arXiv:2609.12450
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12450
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T03:09:06.961Z
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How to cite
PDoS: A Profitable Denial-of-Service Attack against Proof-of-Work Blockchain Liveness — arXiv:2609.12450 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12450 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c126e08e5db9 (Metraipolis archive dc_c126e08e5db9, sha256 10121f41630c0fa582634512a8b9a9fa8f4726db4d62815abf2e4540fe2c46b4)
BibTeX
@misc{dcc126e08e5db9,
title = {PDoS: A Profitable Denial-of-Service Attack against Proof-of-Work Blockchain Liveness — arXiv:2609.12450},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12450},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c126e08e5db9; sha256 10121f41630c0fa582634512a8b9a9fa8f4726db4d62815abf2e4540fe2c46b4},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12450. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
The security and liveness of Proof-of-Work (PoW) blockchains fundamentally depend on the economic rationality of miners. Existing incentive-driven denial-of-service attacks, such as BDoS, can deter rational miners from participating, but require the attacker to continuously absorb substantial economic losses and are therefore difficult to sustain in high-value networks. Meanwhile, prior infiltration-based withholding attacks are designed to extract revenue rather than to directly disrupt chain liveness. We present PDoS, a hybrid attack that combines block header signal deterrence with parasitic revenue extraction. PDoS disrupts blockchain liveness while exploiting the victim pool's share-reward mechanism to subsidize the attack cost, thereby lowering the adversarial hash-power threshold required to induce rational miners to shut down. We further show a counterintuitive result: in high-fee or high-MEV environments, higher block value can make PoW systems less secure by increasing the attacker's parasitic revenue and pushing the attack across the break-even point into a self-sustaining, or even profitable, regime. To the best of our knowledge, PDoS is the first attack to demonstrate that disrupting PoW blockchain liveness can be economically self-sustaining and even profitable. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-14 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12450 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T03:04:07.419Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-14?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).