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On the Fragility of Worst-Case Nash Equilibria in Atomic Congestion Games — arXiv:2609.12220

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12220
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-16T03:09:02.683Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: ccbcaaaadf02edc8bd85abfa591c7730dd59b565131be300cf032bedb15dd93d
Stable URL of this page: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c045fe080ac6

How to cite

On the Fragility of Worst-Case Nash Equilibria in Atomic Congestion Games — arXiv:2609.12220 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12220 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c045fe080ac6 (Metraipolis archive dc_c045fe080ac6, sha256 ccbcaaaadf02edc8bd85abfa591c7730dd59b565131be300cf032bedb15dd93d)

BibTeX

@misc{dcc045fe080ac6,
  title = {On the Fragility of Worst-Case Nash Equilibria in Atomic Congestion Games — arXiv:2609.12220},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12220},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_c045fe080ac6; sha256 ccbcaaaadf02edc8bd85abfa591c7730dd59b565131be300cf032bedb15dd93d},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12220. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Aggregate performance in smart mobility systems depends heavily on the emergent behavior of selfish, resource-sharing agents that participate within the systems. As a result, recent work has focused on how a system designer can leverage incentives to influence behavior so that system cost (e.g., traffic congestion) is minimized. These results show that worst-case equilibria can be quite inefficient compared to system-optimal allocations. However, it is unclear to what extent agents are ``satisfied'' with their decisions in these worst-case scenarios. We demonstrate that in any incentivized atomic congestion game, agents' aggregate satisfaction at equilibrium (relative to their actions in an optimal allocation) is correlated with the efficiency of the corresponding system cost, in the sense that if agents are very satisfied with their equilibrium choices, the equilibrium must be relatively efficient. Further, we show that worst-case Nash equilibria are fragile, as every agent is indifferent between their action in a worst-case equilibrium and their action in a system-optimal allocation. In summary, at equilibrium, either agents are highly satisfied with their decisions or their decisions are highly inefficient, but both cannot be true simultaneously. This work adds to recent results for other classes of games which indicate that worst-case equilibrium efficiency guarantees only occur when agents are indifferent about their decisions.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-14 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12220 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T03:04:07.406Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-14?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).