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On Competing Sellers with Substitutable Goods — arXiv:2611.06595

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06595
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-05T18:20:23.647Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
25afc43dd2009577550d105c377725e15111e8b4247872f8589a40cdd22aecde
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bf5e64b0152e

How to cite

On Competing Sellers with Substitutable Goods — arXiv:2611.06595 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06595 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bf5e64b0152e (Metraipolis archive dc_bf5e64b0152e, sha256 25afc43dd2009577550d105c377725e15111e8b4247872f8589a40cdd22aecde)
BibTeX
@misc{dcbf5e64b0152e,
  title = {On Competing Sellers with Substitutable Goods — arXiv:2611.06595},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06595},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bf5e64b0152e; sha256 25afc43dd2009577550d105c377725e15111e8b4247872f8589a40cdd22aecde},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06595. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study mechanism design by an incumbent seller facing competition from an entrant seller of a substitute good. The incumbent commits to a potentially randomized mechanism before her competitor responds. A unit-demand buyer with fixed, publicly known values for the two goods observes both mechanisms and may interact with them in either order. How should a revenue-maximizing incumbent design her mechanism when her product is superior or inferior to her competitor's? We determine the incumbent's exact optimal revenue and characterize all mechanisms that obtain it. Commitment and randomization allow her to earn strictly positive revenue even against an arbitrarily superior product, despite earning nothing under posted-price (i.e., Bertrand) competition. Optimal mechanisms can require a continuum of lottery options, even though the buyer selects only one in equilibrium: unselected options shape the competitor's incentives rather than screen private buyer information. We also show that the buyer's ability to choose the interaction order can be strictly beneficial to the incumbent, even though the incumbent is always visited first at equilibrium. Finally, we show that without commitment, every pure Nash equilibrium yields Bertrand revenues even with randomized mechanisms.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06595 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-05T18:14:18.995Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).