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Top Trading Cycles with Indifferences under Matroid Constraints — arXiv:2609.32337

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32337
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T22:13:57.889Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
810f58114d2a1272b36653d4ae2c5812c40322119fdb4c5bd3147f434015ec69
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bdc2b9077eaa

How to cite

Top Trading Cycles with Indifferences under Matroid Constraints — arXiv:2609.32337 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32337 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bdc2b9077eaa (Metraipolis archive dc_bdc2b9077eaa, sha256 810f58114d2a1272b36653d4ae2c5812c40322119fdb4c5bd3147f434015ec69)
BibTeX
@misc{dcbdc2b9077eaa,
  title = {Top Trading Cycles with Indifferences under Matroid Constraints — arXiv:2609.32337},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32337},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bdc2b9077eaa; sha256 810f58114d2a1272b36653d4ae2c5812c40322119fdb4c5bd3147f434015ec69},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32337. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study the reallocation of indivisible objects among agents who may hold initial endowments and may be indifferent between objects. Each agent has her own set of admissible objects, and a matroid constraint specifies which combinations of assigned objects are feasible. The model contains the housing market, house allocation with newcomers who hold no endowment, and the assignment of students to schools under matroidal constraints at each school. For this model, we introduce the top-class trading cycles mechanism (TCTC), which extends the top trading cycles mechanism (TTC) to matroid constraints and weak preferences. When a trading cycle is selected, TCTC fixes each agent's top indifference class rather than a specific object and postpones the choice within the class to the end. TCTC is individually rational, Pareto efficient, and weakly group-strategy-proof on the full domain of weak preferences, and it runs in polynomial time. When preferences and reports are strict, TCTC is strongly group-strategy-proof. Together with a known impossibility result, our theorem establishes a maximal domain of school-by-school constraints for individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, and strategy-proofness.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-29 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.32337 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T21:55:21.810Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-29?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).