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Decentralized Optimal Equilibrium Learning Over Dynamic Networks — arXiv:2609.17601

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17601
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-15T14:08:38.779Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
8ff34021b844d058ea5fe58bbbc548fd00af3d76b8fa154749254e5fc6f63395
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bd1504ce435d

How to cite

Decentralized Optimal Equilibrium Learning Over Dynamic Networks — arXiv:2609.17601 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17601 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bd1504ce435d (Metraipolis archive dc_bd1504ce435d, sha256 8ff34021b844d058ea5fe58bbbc548fd00af3d76b8fa154749254e5fc6f63395)
BibTeX
@misc{dcbd1504ce435d,
  title = {Decentralized Optimal Equilibrium Learning Over Dynamic Networks — arXiv:2609.17601},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17601},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bd1504ce435d; sha256 8ff34021b844d058ea5fe58bbbc548fd00af3d76b8fa154749254e5fc6f63395},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17601. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

This paper studies decentralized learning of socially optimal equilibria in finite normal-form games over dynamic communication networks. Each agent observes only its own realized payoffs, does not know the game a priori, and can communicate only with time-varying neighbors using low-bandwidth messages. We propose networked decentralized optimal equilibrium learning dynamics in which agents generate randomized semantic content/discontent signals from local payoff comparisons and exchange time-stamped time-stacked tables rather than raw actions, payoff information or local estimates/parameters. The method combines table fusion with temporal majority reconstruction to mitigate dynamic communication while preserving fully decentralized operation. We establish finite-time logarithmic regret guarantees, with an in-phase exploration perturbation, for optimal equilibrium selection under utilitarian and proportional-fair social welfare objectives. Simulation results further show that the proposed approach can effectively select socially desirable equilibria over dynamic communication networks.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-17 in cs.GT).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.17601 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-15T13:50:52.115Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-17?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).