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Outcome Disclosure and Temporal Refinement in Multi-Battle Team Contests — arXiv:2608.22694
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22694
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-18T10:07:55.958Z
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Outcome Disclosure and Temporal Refinement in Multi-Battle Team Contests — arXiv:2608.22694 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22694 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bbeab4e104d4 (Metraipolis archive dc_bbeab4e104d4, sha256 d5ece137fbbaddec8bcf5bbeea9b68e13022627ee11b040f00512d1bade29eaa)
BibTeX
@misc{dcbbeab4e104d4,
title = {Outcome Disclosure and Temporal Refinement in Multi-Battle Team Contests — arXiv:2608.22694},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22694},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bbeab4e104d4; sha256 d5ece137fbbaddec8bcf5bbeea9b68e13022627ee11b040f00512d1bade29eaa},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22694. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
A team-contest designer values output rather than expenditure; nonlinear conversion makes the distinction consequential. We study two non-pecuniary instruments in majority-rule contests decided by pairwise all-pay battles with private abilities: disclosing resolved outcomes and splitting the battle schedule into finer blocks. Neither changes a battle's average pivotality; each only redistributes it across histories. Under nested information structures, this redistribution makes equilibrium ability-scaled expenditure weakly more dispersed player by player without changing its mean; expected aggregate expenditure is invariant across all designs considered. The resulting convex-order comparison ranks expected total output: convex output costs favor no disclosure and coarser temporal structures, concave costs favor full disclosure and finer ones, and linear costs make both comparisons neutral. The rankings hold for finite-support and smooth continuous-type ability distributions. The mechanism extends to degree-zero component contest technologies with a unique equilibrium outcome distribution. No and full disclosure bound every admissible public garbling. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-25 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.22694 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-18T10:07:37.070Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-08-25?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).