Metraipolis › archive › dc_bbe0dc22dffb

Moral Consumers and the Environment — arXiv:2611.09515

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09515
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-09T23:01:43.592Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
cb187fc0bd829fa778c29323bf18c9a90497f460f27d0b094446856c3f871e30
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bbe0dc22dffb

How to cite

Moral Consumers and the Environment — arXiv:2611.09515 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09515 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bbe0dc22dffb (Metraipolis archive dc_bbe0dc22dffb, sha256 cb187fc0bd829fa778c29323bf18c9a90497f460f27d0b094446856c3f871e30)
BibTeX
@misc{dcbbe0dc22dffb,
  title = {Moral Consumers and the Environment — arXiv:2611.09515},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09515},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bbe0dc22dffb; sha256 cb187fc0bd829fa778c29323bf18c9a90497f460f27d0b094446856c3f871e30},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09515. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study the taxation of environmentally harmful goods when consumers have a Kantian desire to ``do the right thing''. A consumer evaluates her buying strategy, a rule that specifies whether to buy, by the material payoff she would obtain if others followed the same rule with a probability given by her degree of morality. Equilibrium exists and is unique in finite populations with heterogeneous morality. The optimal tax depends crucially on whether consumers are aware that tax revenue is returned to them. If they are, the Pigovian tax is optimal under homogeneous morality, whatever consumers know about environmental costs, and we give conditions under which it remains the unique optimum under heterogeneous morality. If they are not, the optimal tax is lower, and more so the more moral consumers are. Under a quota system such as the EU Emissions Trading System, any cap at least as stringent as the Pigovian quota admits an equilibrium in which morality has no effect on consumers who are aware of the system.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.09515 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-09T22:58:37.057Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).