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Climate Cooperation and Spatial Industrial Relocation: Stability, Emissions, and Regional Policy Incentives — arXiv:2610.10939

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10939
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-09T07:13:31.750Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
746710bf97415a423b907d2b22fe4a458b55ee913756cce303bb50cd377f93ff
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bbc106dae212

How to cite

Climate Cooperation and Spatial Industrial Relocation: Stability, Emissions, and Regional Policy Incentives — arXiv:2610.10939 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10939 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bbc106dae212 (Metraipolis archive dc_bbc106dae212, sha256 746710bf97415a423b907d2b22fe4a458b55ee913756cce303bb50cd377f93ff)
BibTeX
@misc{dcbbc106dae212,
  title = {Climate Cooperation and Spatial Industrial Relocation: Stability, Emissions, and Regional Policy Incentives — arXiv:2610.10939},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10939},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bbc106dae212; sha256 746710bf97415a423b907d2b22fe4a458b55ee913756cce303bb50cd377f93ff},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10939. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Climate policy changes production costs and can reshape the geography of production. We study this spatial channel in a focused model where mobile industrial activity responds to local attractiveness, agglomeration strengthens attractiveness, and carbon policy lowers the profitability of emissions-intensive locations. The model yields an explicit carbon-policy threshold separating spatial instability from stability. When emissions intensity rises with local industrial density, spatial concentration raises aggregate emissions even with unchanged total industrial activity. Embedding these dynamics in a two-jurisdiction policy game creates a wedge between regional and collective incentives: each government values the industrial activity located within its own territory, while aggregate welfare internalizes the effect of policy on economy-wide concentration. With transferable utility, cooperation can select a policy on the stable side of the threshold while the non-cooperative policy lies on the unstable side. A numerical exercise illustrates this regime change. European regional evidence, based on industrial emissions and gross value added at NUTS2 level, documents a positive emissions-activity association and identifies the empirical quantities needed to measure relocation and concentration effects. The analysis links climate cooperation to the spatial organization of production and establishes a benchmark for policy-induced industrial relocation.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ; Analysis of PDEs (math.AP).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.10939 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-09T07:07:27.999Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).