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First-Order Bilevel Optimization for Non-truthful Auction Design — arXiv:2610.40403
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40403
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-31T06:22:25.490Z
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How to cite
First-Order Bilevel Optimization for Non-truthful Auction Design — arXiv:2610.40403 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40403 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bb2d53d7545a (Metraipolis archive dc_bb2d53d7545a, sha256 dcc17853975d23084689411a5f0ce20dab112c53c8d201b7ff36729b0e722686)
BibTeX
@misc{dcbb2d53d7545a,
title = {First-Order Bilevel Optimization for Non-truthful Auction Design — arXiv:2610.40403},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40403},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_bb2d53d7545a; sha256 dcc17853975d23084689411a5f0ce20dab112c53c8d201b7ff36729b0e722686},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40403. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Automated mechanism design has enabled the learning of complex auction mechanisms using neural networks. However, designing non-truthful auctions remains challenging because bidders' equilibrium strategies depend on the auction mechanism and thus evolve as the mechanism is optimized. In this work, we formulate auction design as a Stackelberg game with multiple strategic followers and develop a fully first-order algorithm for revenue optimization in non-truthful auctions. We establish non-asymptotic guarantees for hypergradient approximation and show that, under standard smoothness and strong-monotonicity assumptions, our method reaches an $O(\epsilon)$-stationary point using $\tilde{\mathcal{O}}(\epsilon^{-2})$ first-order oracle calls. Experiments on symmetric and asymmetric single-item auctions, as well as multi-item auctions, show that our method converges faster than second- and zeroth-order baselines and scales better as the number of bidders increases. Our method also discovers auctions that achieve revenue close to truthful baselines. These results provide a scalable framework for automated mechanism design beyond truthful auctions.
Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Optimization and Control (math.OC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40403 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-31T06:08:53.366Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).