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An Empirical Security Analysis of Open-Source Software Used in Onboard Satellite Systems — arXiv:2609.15425
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15425
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-15T23:54:06.005Z
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An Empirical Security Analysis of Open-Source Software Used in Onboard Satellite Systems — arXiv:2609.15425 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15425 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ba014241f812 (Metraipolis archive dc_ba014241f812, sha256 2e2af143968087cb644f4bc39d01745fd2af32371459d457aa888cdb1f41c917)
BibTeX
@misc{dcba014241f812,
title = {An Empirical Security Analysis of Open-Source Software Used in Onboard Satellite Systems — arXiv:2609.15425},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15425},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ba014241f812; sha256 2e2af143968087cb644f4bc39d01745fd2af32371459d457aa888cdb1f41c917},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15425. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
The use of open-source software (OSS) in satellite flight systems is increasing as missions adopt reusable frameworks, shared libraries, and community-maintained components. While this accelerates development, it also introduces software-security risks into systems where patching is costly and failures may affect mission operations. This paper presents an empirical security study of OSS used in onboard satellite systems. We analyze 126 public repositories using a pipeline that combines software bill of materials generation, software composition analysis, static application security testing, infrastructure-as-code analysis, and secret scanning. After rule-based cleaning, onboard-scope filtering, and fingerprint-based deduplication, the pipeline produced a final dataset of 2,827 findings. The results show that security findings are widespread but unevenly distributed. Medium-severity findings account for 49% of the dataset, and 72% are classified as medium severity or higher. A Common Weakness Enumeration (CWE)-based taxonomy assigns all findings to eight weakness families. Memory Safety and Code Quality dominate the dataset, followed by Input Validation and Injection. Most findings occur in project-developed code, accounting for 81.4% of the dataset, while external dependency code remains a relevant source of findings. While these findings do not establish mission-specific exploitability, they provide an empirical characterization of recurring security patterns across the open-source onboard satellite software ecosystem, helping quantify their prevalence and prioritize areas that warrant the greatest security attention. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-15 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.15425 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-15T23:20:42.706Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-15?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).