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Subgame Perfection in Graph Games with $ω$-Recognizable Preference Relations — arXiv:2609.22906
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22906
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-09T06:58:03.850Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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How to cite
Subgame Perfection in Graph Games with $ω$-Recognizable Preference Relations — arXiv:2609.22906 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22906 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_b776718cd07c (Metraipolis archive dc_b776718cd07c, sha256 bc8c6815ae7ba98b6132a823a8d79cc5cab14f224416662f96f85f89389c1c46)
BibTeX
@misc{dcb776718cd07c,
title = {Subgame Perfection in Graph Games with $ω$-Recognizable Preference Relations — arXiv:2609.22906},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22906},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_b776718cd07c; sha256 bc8c6815ae7ba98b6132a823a8d79cc5cab14f224416662f96f85f89389c1c46},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22906. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
This paper investigates the constrained existence problem for subgame perfect equilibria (SPEs) in multiplayer graph games. In the proposed framework, each player has a preference relation over the set of plays, assumed to be $\omega$-recognizable. Equivalently, he has a preference relation over a finite set of payoffs, and the set of plays with the same payoff is $\omega$-regular, for each payoff. This generic framework avoids the need to focus on specific payoff functions. We show that the constrained SPE existence problem is EXPTIME-complete, as well as for Nash equilibria (NEs). Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-22 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.22906 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-09T06:52:12.757Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-09-22?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).