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Multi-Principal Competition for an Exclusive Agent: characterization and approximation of Nash Equilibria — arXiv:2609.04426

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04426
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T23:11:17.546Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
9b477041cab5967c6efd0ca0d48647e8b5231da03c9c84da2366544ca97c32b7
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_b0aed12fba86

How to cite

Multi-Principal Competition for an Exclusive Agent: characterization and approximation of Nash Equilibria — arXiv:2609.04426 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04426 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_b0aed12fba86 (Metraipolis archive dc_b0aed12fba86, sha256 9b477041cab5967c6efd0ca0d48647e8b5231da03c9c84da2366544ca97c32b7)
BibTeX
@misc{dcb0aed12fba86,
  title = {Multi-Principal Competition for an Exclusive Agent: characterization and approximation of Nash Equilibria — arXiv:2609.04426},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04426},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_b0aed12fba86; sha256 9b477041cab5967c6efd0ca0d48647e8b5231da03c9c84da2366544ca97c32b7},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04426. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

This paper introduces and studies a Principal-Agent competition model in which two risk-neutral Principals compete to hire a single Agent. The Agent chooses to work exclusively for one Principal, making the Agent's reservation utility endogenous, as it is determined by the competing offers. We characterize the Nash equilibria of the resulting game by relating them to the individual Principal-Agent contracting problems and analyzing the Agent's selection bias. We further introduce two numerical algorithms to approximate Nash equilibria by locating sign changes of the value functions of the Principals' individual problems. The first is a Newton-type method that exploits differentiability of the value functions, while the second is a bisection method that does not require differentiability. The proposed procedures are illustrated through several examples involving exponential, logarithmic, and constant relative risk aversion (CRRA) utility functions within the polynomial framework of Renner and Schmedders (2015). We also provide technical results regarding the regularity of the value function of a classical Principal-Agent problem, including differentiability under suitable conditions.

Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-07 in math.OC).
Categorie arXiv: Optimization and Control (math.OC).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.04426 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T22:51:59.411Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/math.OC/2026-09-07?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).