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Stable Improvement Cycle Mechanism Versus Efficiency-adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism beyond Weak Priority Orders — arXiv:2609.12543
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- arXiv (en)
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- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12543
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T04:25:14.794Z
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Stable Improvement Cycle Mechanism Versus Efficiency-adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism beyond Weak Priority Orders — arXiv:2609.12543 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12543 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_b00dde68ff18 (Metraipolis archive dc_b00dde68ff18, sha256 6716e3117118844f0c327e9e23eeb9d017a2e22052615331ce74f4051787c83f)
BibTeX
@misc{dcb00dde68ff18,
title = {Stable Improvement Cycle Mechanism Versus Efficiency-adjusted Deferred Acceptance Mechanism beyond Weak Priority Orders — arXiv:2609.12543},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12543},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_b00dde68ff18; sha256 6716e3117118844f0c327e9e23eeb9d017a2e22052615331ce74f4051787c83f},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12543. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
This paper compares the stable improvement cycles (SIC) mechanism of Erdil and Ergin (2008) with the efficiency-adjusted deferred acceptance (EADA) mechanism of Kesten (2010) in school choice problems with incomplete priorities. When school priorities are strict partial orders, we show that the EADA mechanism produces a constrained efficient matching. Combined with earlier results for the SIC mechanism, this establishes the outcome equivalence of the two mechanisms: the sets of matchings attainable under them coincide. We then move beyond transitivity and consider acyclic priority relations. On this broader domain, neither mechanism is guaranteed to produce a constrained efficient matching, but their failures take opposite forms. The SIC mechanism may under-improve: its outcome is always stable but may be Pareto dominated by another stable matching. By contrast, the EADA mechanism may over-improve: its outcome is never Pareto dominated by any stable matching but may itself be unstable. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-14 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12543 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T04:10:45.349Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-14?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).