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ChatGPT as a Surveillance Assistant? An Exploratory Case Study of AI-Assisted Surveillance Risks — arXiv:2610.40890

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40890
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T08:00:33.294Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
2e497a803b06c08d2768f3f9c1da0db9f9d5628181145076620ce3603bd74f68
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_aee1bb9d07ec

How to cite

ChatGPT as a Surveillance Assistant? An Exploratory Case Study of AI-Assisted Surveillance Risks — arXiv:2610.40890 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40890 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_aee1bb9d07ec (Metraipolis archive dc_aee1bb9d07ec, sha256 2e497a803b06c08d2768f3f9c1da0db9f9d5628181145076620ce3603bd74f68)
BibTeX
@misc{dcaee1bb9d07ec,
  title = {ChatGPT as a Surveillance Assistant? An Exploratory Case Study of AI-Assisted Surveillance Risks — arXiv:2610.40890},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40890},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_aee1bb9d07ec; sha256 2e497a803b06c08d2768f3f9c1da0db9f9d5628181145076620ce3603bd74f68},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40890. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Large language models (LLMs) can generate detailed guidance, functional code, and persuasive text at scale. As one of the most widely used consumer language model products as of 2026, ChatGPT gives broad public access to these capabilities, motivating concerns about its potential use in surveillance-related tasks. We present an exploratory case study of what potentially harmful surveillance assistance looks like in ChatGPT's public web interface. We contribute a taxonomy of seven surveillance risk categories based on prior LLM risk research and reports of deployed surveillance systems, instantiated as 110 prompts, along with a manually reviewed analysis of ChatGPT's responses. Prompts were issued using two approaches: 55 jailbreak prompts drawing on five types of elicitation strategies, and 55 plain-language direct prompts, each run alone, and if unsuccessful, again with a short fixed prefix. We find that ChatGPT provides substantive surveillance guidance for 40 of the 55 jailbreak prompts and for 33 of the 55 direct prompts without any prefix. Compliant responses also rarely included policy mentions or suggestions for privacy-preserving alternatives. We manually review every response and find that even when ChatGPT states a refusal, it may still supply detailed instructions, working code, or architectural guidance alongside brief ethical caveats.

Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.AI, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.40890 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T07:59:38.668Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.AI/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).