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The Towers Were Standing: A Cause Decomposition of Cellular Outages During Hurricane Helene — arXiv:2609.10944

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10944
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-16T05:45:05.845Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
6b603cae57583f88d671acc9149b4304e29b4a1acf8962274eb044048b49e04f
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae8fda351084

How to cite

The Towers Were Standing: A Cause Decomposition of Cellular Outages During Hurricane Helene — arXiv:2609.10944 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10944 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae8fda351084 (Metraipolis archive dc_ae8fda351084, sha256 6b603cae57583f88d671acc9149b4304e29b4a1acf8962274eb044048b49e04f)
BibTeX
@misc{dcae8fda351084,
  title = {The Towers Were Standing: A Cause Decomposition of Cellular Outages During Hurricane Helene — arXiv:2609.10944},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10944},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae8fda351084; sha256 6b603cae57583f88d671acc9149b4304e29b4a1acf8962274eb044048b49e04f},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10944. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Hurricane Helene produced the largest absolute cell-site outage in the public FCC record, peaking at 4562 sites. The conventional model is physical: towers destroyed. Helene did destroy over 1700 miles of fibre, but almost none of it was cell sites. We present the first cause-decomposed study of the FCC's Disaster Information Reporting System, reconstructing 80 state-days and 580 county-days from 24 daily filings by two reconciled independent extractions. Damage to cell sites is negligible: 1.1% of attributed cell-site-days across six states, at most 3.8% anywhere. The sites were standing. What took them out divides by terrain: pooled, power dominates at 63.2%, but in mountainous North Carolina severed transport (backhaul) reaches 52.2% against 47.3%, and in Tennessee 69.9%. North Carolina's transport share rises from 7.0% to 85.0% across the event (\r{ho} = 0.92). Seventeen days after landfall, on 15 October, 47 sites lost transport across six contiguous North Carolina counties with no rainfall, no power loss, no damage, and recovery by the next report. Independent active-probe measurement corroborates it: responsive /24s fall 1.02% for twelve hours while Tennessee stays flat. We release the dataset. Backup power is the standard resilience investment; here it addresses the smaller half of the problem.

Tema degli esploratori: governance digitale e beni comuni (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-11 in cs.CY).
Categorie arXiv: Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI) ; Computers and Society (cs.CY).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.10944 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T05:29:23.834Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CY/2026-09-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).