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Calibrated Bait: Defensive Information Design under Adversarial Fingerprinting — arXiv:2609.26797

Source: arXiv (en)
Original: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26797
License (as archived): CC0-1.0
Archived: 2026-10-08T13:35:31.534Z
SHA-256 of the archived text: a7b2d795d4a699366b3e1e5c2919c9cde8f76924f69c5a1d6bc89333c9384ff0
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How to cite

Calibrated Bait: Defensive Information Design under Adversarial Fingerprinting — arXiv:2609.26797 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26797 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae8745fc9503 (Metraipolis archive dc_ae8745fc9503, sha256 a7b2d795d4a699366b3e1e5c2919c9cde8f76924f69c5a1d6bc89333c9384ff0)

BibTeX

@misc{dcae8745fc9503,
  title = {Calibrated Bait: Defensive Information Design under Adversarial Fingerprinting — arXiv:2609.26797},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26797},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae8745fc9503; sha256 a7b2d795d4a699366b3e1e5c2919c9cde8f76924f69c5a1d6bc89333c9384ff0},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26797. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

A honeytoken, a decoy credential or record whose use reveals an intruder, produces defence intelligence only if an adversary sometimes treats it as genuine. The adversary can instead pay to fingerprint it. I model this problem as information design followed by receiver information acquisition. Without fingerprinting, a defender whose installed trap prevalence exceeds the adversary's participation boundary places the attacked pool exactly at that boundary: calibrated bait. That posterior also maximises the gross value of any fixed informative diagnostic with finitely many signal outcomes. For a perfect covert test, the resulting appearance design has a closed-form, prior-dependent characterisation: expensive testing preserves calibrated bait, intermediate-cost testing produces under-calibrated bait, and cheap testing yields pooling, protected segmentation or abstention. Free and costless adjustment of trap prevalence makes non-degenerate segmentation unnecessary, but a sufficiently large adjustment cost around a sufficiently high inherited composition can sustain it. Finally, along an exogenously declining fingerprinting-cost path, lower cost reduces trap activation without reducing genuine compromise within the under-calibrated regime. Evaluation against fresh attackers can therefore overstate the durability of reusable bait.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-24 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.26797 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-08T13:15:31.613Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-24?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).