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Equilibria and Learning in Competitive Market Making — arXiv:2610.30891
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30891
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-25T08:39:40.210Z
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Equilibria and Learning in Competitive Market Making — arXiv:2610.30891 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30891 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae836efdb0ad (Metraipolis archive dc_ae836efdb0ad, sha256 cbdb4602f58a31736517434c8542a5a376f2c657731b8fc1e279c29f51475915)
BibTeX
@misc{dcae836efdb0ad,
title = {Equilibria and Learning in Competitive Market Making — arXiv:2610.30891},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30891},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae836efdb0ad; sha256 cbdb4602f58a31736517434c8542a5a376f2c657731b8fc1e279c29f51475915},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30891. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We propose a market-making game played among $N \ge 2$ strategic market makers and a single non-strategic representative trader. In a continuous quote space, standard finite-game arguments do not apply, while non-convex and discontinuous payoffs rule out classical continuous existence results and complicate learning. Nonetheless, we characterize pure-strategy Nash equilibria (PSNEs) and show that at least one PSNE always exists under minimal assumptions on the underlying asset value distribution, and that the equilibrium bid-ask spread widens strictly with asset value volatility. To obtain a tractable learning framework, we discretize prices and, under an additional regularity condition, show that the time-averaged play of no-internal-regret learners approaches the continuous Nash price envelope as the tick size vanishes. Finally, we empirically validate our theoretical results through numerical simulations. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Machine Learning (cs.LG); Trading and Market Microstructure (q-fin.TR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.30891 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-25T08:33:12.788Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).