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Structural Leakage in Graph Encryption: Attacks and Defenses — arXiv:2608.13981

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13981
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T02:29:31.952Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
a60790daffd2020b947651993b85ef2fbcc6219b0113bee148776ee7c18838e5
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae5f79809144

How to cite

Structural Leakage in Graph Encryption: Attacks and Defenses — arXiv:2608.13981 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13981 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae5f79809144 (Metraipolis archive dc_ae5f79809144, sha256 a60790daffd2020b947651993b85ef2fbcc6219b0113bee148776ee7c18838e5)
BibTeX
@misc{dcae5f79809144,
  title = {Structural Leakage in Graph Encryption: Attacks and Defenses — arXiv:2608.13981},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13981},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae5f79809144; sha256 a60790daffd2020b947651993b85ef2fbcc6219b0113bee148776ee7c18838e5},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13981. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Graph encryption schemes (GES) enable secure outsourcing of graph data while supporting efficient queries. This report provides a comprehensive analysis of structural leakage in GES for single-pair shortest path (SPSP) queries, integrating findings from two recent works. First, we analyze PathGES, a scheme designed to resist query recovery attacks through heavy-light decomposition (HLD) and canonical fragment encoding. Our analysis reveals that PathGES suffers from significant imbalances in HLD decomposition, with over 99% of token-path mappings being one-to-one on real-world datasets, enabling both the Falzon-Paterson attack and side-channel inference of path lengths. Second, we present Fragment Tree attack that exploits these structural weaknesses to recover query contents, achieving up to 10.24% exact recovery on sparse graphs. Third, we introduce BlindGES, an enhanced scheme incorporating a Merge-and-Divide mechanism and two-level multimap index that reduces one-to-one mappings to below 20%, cuts setup time by 50%, reduces storage overhead by 32%, and limits path length leakage to under 1%. This report systematically presents attack methodologies, defense mechanisms, security proofs, and experimental evaluations on seven real-world datasets.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-17 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.13981 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T02:25:38.616Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-08-17?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).