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Path-Finding, Orbit State Preparation, and the Security of Invariant Quantum Money — arXiv:2609.39774

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39774
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-07T13:43:18.974Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
33aa0cfd873fad56deebc059d548babe417398320c3671e653a29485882be828
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae582de79b04

How to cite

Path-Finding, Orbit State Preparation, and the Security of Invariant Quantum Money — arXiv:2609.39774 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39774 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae582de79b04 (Metraipolis archive dc_ae582de79b04, sha256 33aa0cfd873fad56deebc059d548babe417398320c3671e653a29485882be828)
BibTeX
@misc{dcae582de79b04,
  title = {Path-Finding, Orbit State Preparation, and the Security of Invariant Quantum Money — arXiv:2609.39774},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39774},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ae582de79b04; sha256 33aa0cfd873fad56deebc059d548babe417398320c3671e653a29485882be828},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39774. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

The security of quantum money from knots, and of its generalization to invariant money, is based on the assumption that path-finding, exhibiting a sequence of moves between two equivalent objects, is hard. No proof of security from that assumption alone is known. The existing proofs add knowledge-of-path assumptions, which assert that any efficient algorithm producing two objects with the same invariant implicitly knows a path between them. No attack can refute such an assumption, and it is not known to follow from security. We ask when path-finding is the right assumption. When each equivalence class is the orbit of an efficiently computable action of a group that can be superposed over, and every move acts as a group element, as for graphs, average-case hardness of path-finding is necessary for security. For knots no such group is known, and a path-finder only reduces forgery to an equally hard state-preparation problem. With or without a path-finder, a forger must prepare a state that verification accepts, and we take the hardness of that task as the assumption. For schemes whose verification walk mixes in polynomial time, the preparation assumption states that no efficient algorithm, given the serial number of a freshly minted banknote and one object measured from it, prepares such a state. It is falsifiable, and it is equivalent to security against forgers that measure their banknote first. The transfer assumption, which security implies, states that measuring first costs a forger at most a polynomial factor. Together the two are equivalent to security, so every proof of security must establish the preparation assumption. If the preparation assumption holds, no fully black-box reduction that calls the forger only at the serial number it is given can derive the transfer assumption from the preparation assumption.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-10-01 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.39774 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-07T13:16:25.236Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-10-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).