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When Do Differentially Private Inputs Protect Graph Shift Operators? — arXiv:2609.28899
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28899
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T04:53:18.914Z
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When Do Differentially Private Inputs Protect Graph Shift Operators? — arXiv:2609.28899 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28899 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_adcc3a440994 (Metraipolis archive dc_adcc3a440994, sha256 fd2b1515565009978fe9646fbb6e72b2ad0a66a2f3c4990e5f879707e17f71de)
BibTeX
@misc{dcadcc3a440994,
title = {When Do Differentially Private Inputs Protect Graph Shift Operators? — arXiv:2609.28899},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28899},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_adcc3a440994; sha256 fd2b1515565009978fe9646fbb6e72b2ad0a66a2f3c4990e5f879707e17f71de},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28899. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We study the differential privacy (DP) of a graph shift operator (GSO) when an analyst observes the output of a graph filter. In particular, we study the setting in which the input signals to the graph filter are drawn from a differentially private distribution. Unlike approaches that perturb the GSO or the filter output, we use the randomness already present in the inputs to protect the GSO. This yields an equivalent level of privacy protection to that of the perturbation methods without adding noise, and thus a better privacy-utility trade-off. We provide an explicit characterization of the privacy loss and its certificate in terms of the zeros of the graph filter. In doing so, we show that the log-likelihood ratio between the releases of two adjacent topologies is governed by the distances from each zero to the graph frequencies of the two GSOs. Then, by uniformly bounding the log-likelihood ratio over the adjacent topologies, we obtain an explicit $(\varepsilon,\delta)$-DP guarantee for Gaussian inputs. We further show, via a Cramér--Rao bound, that the zero placement that limits the privacy loss also raises the floor on the adversary's reconstruction error. Finally, empirical validation is performed on a synthetic network of financial exposures, where the largest position a pair can conceal and the accuracy with which it can be sized are collinear across pairs. Both are set by the graph-frequency content of the pair, and the full network becomes recoverable only as the certified budget grows. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-25 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Signal Processing (eess.SP). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28899 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-08T04:30:43.805Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-25?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).