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Pure Risk — arXiv:2608.29506

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29506
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T10:41:59.066Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
b34b6a69549f08e24f0df00fd9d07be4e29a8928731c48953a86254b80eb32c9
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ab2cba968f7d

How to cite

Pure Risk — arXiv:2608.29506 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29506 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ab2cba968f7d (Metraipolis archive dc_ab2cba968f7d, sha256 b34b6a69549f08e24f0df00fd9d07be4e29a8928731c48953a86254b80eb32c9)
BibTeX
@misc{dcab2cba968f7d,
  title = {Pure Risk — arXiv:2608.29506},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29506},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_ab2cba968f7d; sha256 b34b6a69549f08e24f0df00fd9d07be4e29a8928731c48953a86254b80eb32c9},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29506. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We introduce a behavioral notion of domain-specific risk aversion that separates attitudes toward risk from deterministic utility: an agent is more pure risk averse in one domain than in another if, for prizes that are indifferent under certainty, he is more averse to risk in the former domain than in the latter. We develop a model that goes beyond expected utility by allowing risk attitudes to vary across domains, while preserving expected utility within each domain. The domains are subjective and need not be specified in advance; they are identified from choice behavior. We establish uniqueness of the model's parameters and provide an axiomatic characterization.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-01 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.29506 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T10:29:25.580Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-01?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).