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Artificial intelligence and biosecurity: capabilities, threat pathways, and defense-in-depth governance — arXiv:2609.16213
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16213
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-15T18:31:59.734Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
aa2c4b228b029d82dd7e42bd9e002fd107584f6a15222bc59e53a51b4ed8446d- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
Artificial intelligence and biosecurity: capabilities, threat pathways, and defense-in-depth governance — arXiv:2609.16213 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16213 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_aaeb9b8941ca (Metraipolis archive dc_aaeb9b8941ca, sha256 aa2c4b228b029d82dd7e42bd9e002fd107584f6a15222bc59e53a51b4ed8446d)
BibTeX
@misc{dcaaeb9b8941ca,
title = {Artificial intelligence and biosecurity: capabilities, threat pathways, and defense-in-depth governance — arXiv:2609.16213},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16213},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_aaeb9b8941ca; sha256 aa2c4b228b029d82dd7e42bd9e002fd107584f6a15222bc59e53a51b4ed8446d},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16213. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Artificial intelligence is reshaping biological research across an increasingly connected digital-to-physical workflow. General-purpose large language models can retrieve and integrate scientific information, support experimental planning, and computational analysis; biological foundation models can predict, optimize, and generate proteins, genes, and genome-scale sequences; agentic systems can coordinate multistep research tasks; automated laboratories can partially close the design-build-test-learn cycle. These technologies could greatly benefit medicine, public health, and biotechnology. However, their biosecurity risk depends not only on what the AI can do, but also on who uses it, their expertise and intent, their access to laboratory tools and materials, and the safeguards in place. Current evidence shows that AI uplift exists but primarily affects digital rather than physical tasks. Frontier systems have exceeded expert baselines on in-silico, and screening-evasion benchmarks, whereas controlled wet-laboratory studies find that tacit knowledge and physical execution remain substantial barriers. This review describes the different biological threats from AI tool use, from information gathering and biological design to procurement, synthesis, testing, scale-up, and potential release. We further examine why alignment techniques for general-purpose models transfer poorly to biological ones, and the emerging role of interpretability in auditing whether hazardous capabilities are genuinely removed. We argue for defense-in-depth governance that links capability thresholds to proportionate responsibilities across the biological AI ecosystem, reducing high-consequence risk while preserving beneficial use. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-16 in cs.AI). Categorie arXiv: Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.16213 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-15T18:03:09.414Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.AI/2026-09-16?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).