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Breaking High Confidence: Practical Face Impersonation under High-Security Thresholds — arXiv:2608.20884

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20884
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-18T10:53:02.177Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
9372150de94765d7ef9fa3ee8d97770a71875cea801f9dde127e4b084988e02e
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a8a27320f18d

How to cite

Breaking High Confidence: Practical Face Impersonation under High-Security Thresholds — arXiv:2608.20884 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20884 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a8a27320f18d (Metraipolis archive dc_a8a27320f18d, sha256 9372150de94765d7ef9fa3ee8d97770a71875cea801f9dde127e4b084988e02e)
BibTeX
@misc{dca8a27320f18d,
  title = {Breaking High Confidence: Practical Face Impersonation under High-Security Thresholds — arXiv:2608.20884},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20884},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a8a27320f18d; sha256 9372150de94765d7ef9fa3ee8d97770a71875cea801f9dde127e4b084988e02e},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20884. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Face recognition systems (FRSs) are increasingly deployed in critical real-world services for authentication, such as banking applications and airport identity checks, necessitating stringent security configurations. Consequently, the security vulnerabilities of FRSs have garnered significant attention. While existing studies have extensively explored FRS security, prior analyses have primarily focused on medium-security threshold settings, which are not directly applicable to FRSs operating under high-security constraints. In this paper, we propose the first successful impersonation attack against FRSs under high-security threshold settings. Among various threat models, we focus on a practical and challenging scenario: score-based impersonation attacks under strict rate limits. To precisely evaluate the feasibility of such attacks, we provide a principled mathematical analysis characterizing the gaps in each stage of the attack pipeline. Our method significantly enhances impersonation capabilities in score-based attacks, even under elevated decision thresholds. On the LFW benchmark, with a budget of only 100 confidence score queries per identity, our attack achieves an impersonation success rate exceeding 92\% against Amazon Rekognition at a confidence score threshold of 99-recommended setting for law enforcement scenarios. We further observe consistently robust performance across multiple open-source FRSs evaluated at similarly stringent decision thresholds.

Tema degli esploratori: statistica e scienza dei dati (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-24 in cs.CV).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Vision and Pattern Recognition (cs.CV).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.20884 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-18T10:48:13.573Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CV/2026-08-24?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).