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College Admissions with Scholarship — arXiv:2608.08136

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.08136
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T09:44:42.649Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
28cd6fe3cd59cb2b79b89d76f25f0b47e10604d936e277388b37b7fb2ac360bc
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a7d1aec50809

How to cite

College Admissions with Scholarship — arXiv:2608.08136 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.08136 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a7d1aec50809 (Metraipolis archive dc_a7d1aec50809, sha256 28cd6fe3cd59cb2b79b89d76f25f0b47e10604d936e277388b37b7fb2ac360bc)
BibTeX
@misc{dca7d1aec50809,
  title = {College Admissions with Scholarship — arXiv:2608.08136},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.08136},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a7d1aec50809; sha256 28cd6fe3cd59cb2b79b89d76f25f0b47e10604d936e277388b37b7fb2ac360bc},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.08136. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Merit-based scholarships are widely used to attract high-achieving students, but do they guarantee an improvement in the merit of a university's student pool? We study this question in centralized college admissions using a matching with contracts framework. We first introduce the scholarship choice rule, which processes scholarship levels from highest to lowest and selects the highest-merit students at each level. We show that scholarship feasibility, scholarship maximality, and no justified envy uniquely characterize this rule. We further characterize the student-proposing deferred-acceptance mechanism based on this rule as the unique mechanism, up to outcome equivalence, satisfying the extensions of the three axioms, together with individual rationality, and strategy-proofness. We then study the welfare effects of scholarship provision. In general matching markets, a university may be matched with lower-merit students after introducing a scholarship. Finally, when all schools use the scholarship choice rule and every student is eligible for every scholarship level a school offers, we show that a common merit ranking is necessary and sufficient for scholarship provision to guarantee, for every student-preference profile satisfying within-school monotonicity, a weak improvement in the scholarship-providing school's student pool.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-11 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.08136 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T09:36:16.425Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-08-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).