Metraipolis › archive › dc_a6e313b2f989
Capacity Markets for Large Loads under Supply-Chain Constraints — arXiv:2608.06528
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06528
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-19T09:50:56.726Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
4f141e3eac1f800d3149a37fe874c8a76dbd1bc03f706c68e9bb3bb5c9018732- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a6e313b2f989
How to cite
Capacity Markets for Large Loads under Supply-Chain Constraints — arXiv:2608.06528 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06528 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a6e313b2f989 (Metraipolis archive dc_a6e313b2f989, sha256 4f141e3eac1f800d3149a37fe874c8a76dbd1bc03f706c68e9bb3bb5c9018732)
BibTeX
@misc{dca6e313b2f989,
title = {Capacity Markets for Large Loads under Supply-Chain Constraints — arXiv:2608.06528},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06528},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a6e313b2f989; sha256 4f141e3eac1f800d3149a37fe874c8a76dbd1bc03f706c68e9bb3bb5c9018732},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06528. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Motivated by the rapid growth of data centers, we develop a model to evaluate bringyour-own-capacity (BYOC) mandates and flexibility accreditation in capacity markets for new large loads with shared supply-chain constraints. With efficient pricing, BYOC mainly reallocates procurement between grid-built and self-built capacity and therefore has little welfare effect, while flexibility delivers a modest gain by reducing the effective capacity requirement. Under administrative price caps, mandates can improve static welfare by forcing data centers to internalize the full cost of capacity. The welfare ranking of the two instruments depends on supply-chain stress. At low or moderate stress, only the flexibility instrument raises welfare. Under severe stress with capped prices, the welfare gain from the BYOC obligation can exceed the gross flexibility benefit. The two instruments differ in their effects on a neighboring market: a unilateral BYOC mandate can crowd out its capacity investment, while flexibility produces essentially no spillover at our calibrated benchmark. Finally, applying current capacity non-performance penalties to flexible loads may lead to financial incentives that are too weak to induce truthful flexibility reporting. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-10 in econ.GN). Categorie arXiv: Systems and Control (eess.SY) ; General Economics (econ.GN). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.06528 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-19T09:49:34.964Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.GN/2026-08-10?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).