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Building a Sovereign Benchmark The Limits of Private Coordination — arXiv:2610.19516

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19516
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-15T15:02:47.905Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
2b01abdd77d91162569bdbe58e26e37371c126705c956c7b5216b9ba8b6ce19c
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a6336dccb487

How to cite

Building a Sovereign Benchmark The Limits of Private Coordination — arXiv:2610.19516 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19516 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a6336dccb487 (Metraipolis archive dc_a6336dccb487, sha256 2b01abdd77d91162569bdbe58e26e37371c126705c956c7b5216b9ba8b6ce19c)
BibTeX
@misc{dca6336dccb487,
  title = {Building a Sovereign Benchmark The Limits of Private Coordination — arXiv:2610.19516},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19516},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a6336dccb487; sha256 2b01abdd77d91162569bdbe58e26e37371c126705c956c7b5216b9ba8b6ce19c},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19516. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

Public debt supplies liquidity and collateral services only if institutions coordinate on using the same claim. We study this coordination when use carries a recurring cost and a benefit that rises with other users. Above a quality threshold, two positive-adoption equilibria exist, and under best responses the initial user base decides between collapse and high adoption. Under logit choice, as the population grows and noise vanishes, the long-run distribution selects high adoption only above a strictly higher threshold. Debt issuance improves market depth but eventually dilutes backing per claim. This trade-off creates a range of debt levels supporting the liquidity premium of public debt in macroeconomic models and a narrower range supporting its long-run selection. At the boundary of the wider range, the premium is discontinuous. A matching transfer that corrects the adoption externality makes stationary selection maximize network surplus. Transfers can also help launch a network without permanent support.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.19516 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-15T14:06:53.562Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).