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Knowledge-Based Mechanisms — arXiv:2609.03439

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03439
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T03:22:34.285Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
40418bd52e433819f1b33666171c515d8f25adc2b4ea60a5bf57c1a22a1cdbb9
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a6319bc77fb5

How to cite

Knowledge-Based Mechanisms — arXiv:2609.03439 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03439 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a6319bc77fb5 (Metraipolis archive dc_a6319bc77fb5, sha256 40418bd52e433819f1b33666171c515d8f25adc2b4ea60a5bf57c1a22a1cdbb9)
BibTeX
@misc{dca6319bc77fb5,
  title = {Knowledge-Based Mechanisms — arXiv:2609.03439},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03439},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a6319bc77fb5; sha256 40418bd52e433819f1b33666171c515d8f25adc2b4ea60a5bf57c1a22a1cdbb9},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03439. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study robust mechanisms when the designer possesses a Bayesian belief over some components of agents' private information but faces ambiguity over others. The designer evaluates mechanisms by their worst-case performance over all joint distributions consistent with her belief over the Bayesian components. The framework encompasses settings such as multidimensional delegation in which a principal knows the distribution of the state but not the agent's preferences (e.g., his tradeoffs across dimensions), screening in which a seller only has misspecified estimates of buyer preferences, and auction and voting design when agents' beliefs about each other are ambiguous to the designer. We provide conditions under which a \emph{knowledge-based} mechanism---one that conditions only on the Bayesian components but not the ambiguous ones---is robustly optimal. Our results unify earlier work across distinct economic environments and uncover new applications.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-04 in econ.TH).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.03439 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T03:08:33.216Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-04?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).