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Regret Bounds for Market Making with Persistent Orders — arXiv:2611.06159

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06159
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-05T18:20:22.658Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
4ee0d94ba746c8ce0dc0ce0441e98198b23744e8bf17612f7d93480ca82e033c
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a601c7bfda76

How to cite

Regret Bounds for Market Making with Persistent Orders — arXiv:2611.06159 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06159 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a601c7bfda76 (Metraipolis archive dc_a601c7bfda76, sha256 4ee0d94ba746c8ce0dc0ce0441e98198b23744e8bf17612f7d93480ca82e033c)
BibTeX
@misc{dca601c7bfda76,
  title = {Regret Bounds for Market Making with Persistent Orders — arXiv:2611.06159},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06159},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a601c7bfda76; sha256 4ee0d94ba746c8ce0dc0ce0441e98198b23744e8bf17612f7d93480ca82e033c},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06159. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study adversarial market making with orders that remain active until execution. The maker operates on two markets: a primary market where orders are made and a secondary market where the resulting positions are hedged. In each round, the maker posts a quote on the primary market before observing both primary and secondary market prices. An order executes when the primary price reaches its quote, and the resulting position is immediately offset at the secondary price. When both price sequences are chosen by an adversary over $T$ rounds, we give a simple deterministic policy with regret of order $\log T$ against the best fixed quote (static comparator) and $\sqrt T$ against the best quote for each submission date (dynamic comparator), plus two terms measuring exposure to future primary and secondary prices. These rates remain optimal even when both exposure terms vanish and lower bounds show that the exposure terms are necessary. Our policy naturally extends to simultaneous bids and asks, where we show that static and dynamic regret are both characterized (up to constant factors) by the exposures terms (where the primary price exposure $V_T^{\mathrm{two}}$ now accounts for both bids and asks) and a term of order $\sqrt{V_T^{\mathrm{two}}\log T}$. Our policy is simple, efficient and fully parameterless. We extend this setting by demonstrating how natural assumptions on the price processes lead to improved guarantees without changing the policy.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Machine Learning (cs.LG).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.06159 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-05T18:14:18.993Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).