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Normal-Form Correlation in Markov Games — arXiv:2610.03621

Source
arXiv
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03621
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-05T22:56:20.930Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
6ef1576128a0d474e7f338aabdcc9fc954cecd13cea25a2acb2a834dc3042405
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a4d7b8ac598f

How to cite

Normal-Form Correlation in Markov Games — arXiv:2610.03621 — arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03621 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a4d7b8ac598f (Metraipolis archive dc_a4d7b8ac598f, sha256 6ef1576128a0d474e7f338aabdcc9fc954cecd13cea25a2acb2a834dc3042405)
BibTeX
@misc{dca4d7b8ac598f,
  title = {Normal-Form Correlation in Markov Games — arXiv:2610.03621},
  howpublished = {arXiv},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03621},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a4d7b8ac598f; sha256 6ef1576128a0d474e7f338aabdcc9fc954cecd13cea25a2acb2a834dc3042405},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv, https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03621. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

There has been a surge of recent work on correlated equilibrium concepts in Markov games. However, existing results focus on concepts weaker than normal-form correlated equilibria (NFCEs), leaving open the more challenging question of computing such equilibria, which goes back to the seminal work of Papadimitriou and Roughgarden (JACM'08). Here, we establish the first efficient algorithm for NFCEs in finite-horizon Markov games with a fixed number of players $n$. In particular, with $S$ states, horizon $H$, and at most $A$ actions per player, it computes an $\epsilon$-NFCE in time $S(AH/\epsilon)^{O(n)}$. This is the first algorithm polynomial in $1/\epsilon$ and the description of the game for NFCEs in an interesting class of problems beyond the normal-form setting. Moreover, under the usual assumption that recommendations are independent across states, we show PPAD-completeness---that is, computational equivalence to Nash equilibria---either in many-player games or when the precision is exponentially small. The key idea behind our approach is to run backward induction on a sequence of auxiliary stage games, but with the twist that in each step we compute a constant-expectation correlated equilibrium. This is a natural refinement of correlated equilibrium in which the conditional expected payoff from obeying is independent of the recommendation. In fact, our reduction goes both ways, establishing an equivalence between constant-expectation CEs and NFCEs in Markov games. For a fixed number of players, we observe that a constant-expectation CE can be computed approximately by combining linear programming with suitable discretization. In contrast, it is PPAD-hard in i) polymatrix (many-player) games at constant precision, and ii) two-player games at exponentially small precision. The latter result follows from an unexpected connection to rank-2 two-player games.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT) ; Computational Complexity (cs.CC); Data Structures and Algorithms (cs.DS); Machine Learning (cs.LG).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.03621 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-05T22:47:25.512Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).