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On the difficulty of characterizing top trading cycles with identical houses — arXiv:2611.03251

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03251
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-11-03T19:07:17.320Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
c069cbc36b82fe1f43aedbe9724357b5d61a2dd2c5e6d005d62ab91a6dac7373
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https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a45d396cf4f9

How to cite

On the difficulty of characterizing top trading cycles with identical houses — arXiv:2611.03251 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03251 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a45d396cf4f9 (Metraipolis archive dc_a45d396cf4f9, sha256 c069cbc36b82fe1f43aedbe9724357b5d61a2dd2c5e6d005d62ab91a6dac7373)
BibTeX
@misc{dca45d396cf4f9,
  title = {On the difficulty of characterizing top trading cycles with identical houses — arXiv:2611.03251},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03251},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a45d396cf4f9; sha256 c069cbc36b82fe1f43aedbe9724357b5d61a2dd2c5e6d005d62ab91a6dac7373},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03251. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study Shapley-Scarf housing markets (Shapley and Scarf, 1974) in which houses come in types and agents are indifferent between houses of the same type but rank the types strictly. On this domain of objective indifferences, top trading cycles (TTC) rules with fixed tie-breaking regain Pareto efficiency and group strategy-proofness (Sandholtz and Tai, 2026), properties that need not hold under general weak preferences. We ask whether the characterization of the TTC rule for strict preferences by Ma (1994) and the characterization of TTC rules with fixed tie-breaking for weak preferences by Ehlers (2014) extend to this domain. They do not. With five agents and two types of houses, we construct a rule that satisfies individual rationality, Pareto efficiency, group strategy-proofness, non-bossiness, and consistency, but whose restriction to the five-agent population is not welfare equivalent to any TTC rule with fixed tie-breaking. With two types, five agents are minimal for this fixed-population result. The same rule shows that several other characterizations of TTC for strict preferences do not extend either.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv econ.TH, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2611.03251 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-11-03T18:25:22.745Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/econ.TH/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).