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Merging Cyber Threat Intelligence Through Retrieval-Augmented Generation and Small Language Models for Rich Threat Representation — arXiv:2609.07280
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.07280
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T13:40:19.684Z
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Merging Cyber Threat Intelligence Through Retrieval-Augmented Generation and Small Language Models for Rich Threat Representation — arXiv:2609.07280 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.07280 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a23582121fbc (Metraipolis archive dc_a23582121fbc, sha256 b1098610382ff1a7d87e87c8037a14c0974cd8ca055ab2b6316f2f30a3881d85)
BibTeX
@misc{dca23582121fbc,
title = {Merging Cyber Threat Intelligence Through Retrieval-Augmented Generation and Small Language Models for Rich Threat Representation — arXiv:2609.07280},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.07280},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a23582121fbc; sha256 b1098610382ff1a7d87e87c8037a14c0974cd8ca055ab2b6316f2f30a3881d85},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.07280. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Modern cybersecurity operations rely on CTI collected from heterogeneous sources, including semi-structured threat representations, IoCs, and narrative technical reports. However, these artifacts are often insufficient in isolation to reconstruct how an attack unfolds, under which conditions each step is feasible, and which traces it leaves behind. In practice, analysts must manually correlate partial evidence scattered across multiple and only partially structured sources, delaying the design of effective prevention, detection, and response actions. To address this gap, we propose an automated pipeline that derives an actionable representation of a cyberattack from heterogeneous CTI sources. The pipeline combines a RAG architecture with a locally deployable SLM, used to consolidate such evidence and infer missing operational details. Starting from a semi-structured threat representation and auxiliary CTI documents, the pipeline produces an enriched Attack Graph that captures a coarse, tactic-aligned progression of the attack and annotates each step with explicit pre-conditions and post-conditions, and an enriched description. This representation supports prevention by exposing execution requirements, detection by highlighting observable traces, and response by clarifying the temporal progression of the attack. Then, due to the lack of validated datasets with ground-truth information on the temporal evolution of real-world attacks, we test the complete pipeline on 10 real-world case studies spanning multiple threat types, including backdoors and staged downloaders delivered via phishing. A manual assessment across 10 real-world case studies provides initial evidence that the generated graphs are consistent with expected attack progressions, indicating that the proposed approach can support analysts by consolidating dispersed CTI evidence into a structured and actionable view of attacks. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-09 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.07280 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T13:09:48.462Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-09?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).