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Inevitability of Encrypted Traffic Side-Channel Leakage in the Multi-Class Setting — arXiv:2609.06322
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06322
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T13:40:10.618Z
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Inevitability of Encrypted Traffic Side-Channel Leakage in the Multi-Class Setting — arXiv:2609.06322 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06322 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a1992bb36d83 (Metraipolis archive dc_a1992bb36d83, sha256 765354025925e0053c6196a737cf1ee664ad3699c255897203ea83c24ef669ac)
BibTeX
@misc{dca1992bb36d83,
title = {Inevitability of Encrypted Traffic Side-Channel Leakage in the Multi-Class Setting — arXiv:2609.06322},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06322},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a1992bb36d83; sha256 765354025925e0053c6196a737cf1ee664ad3699c255897203ea83c24ef669ac},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06322. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
The Side-Channel Existence Theorem proves $I(X;Y)>0$ in the binary, undefended setting, but is confined to pairwise arguments and ignores active defenses. We extend it to $k$ classes via the per-class decomposition $I(X;Y)=\sum_i\pi_i D_{\mathrm{KL}}(P_{Y|i}\|P_Y)$, with defense cost modelled by per-class Wasserstein-1 constraints $\sup_x W_1(Q_x^D,P_x)\le B$. Three results follow: (1) a summation-form MI lower bound over all active classes; (2) a cascade critical cost theorem and a per-class budget corollary, nonzero where the uniform-budget bound vanishes; (3) an accuracy corollary $\mathrm{Acc}^*\ge 2^{I_0}/k>1/k$. On a 95-class website fingerprinting dataset the measured MI has a strictly positive $95\%$ confidence lower bound under every defense tested. Against the strongest pairwise baseline---a convex program over all $\binom{k}{2}$ triangle constraints, also $\Theta(1)$ in $k$ under the same non-vanishing-gap conditions---the summation form is only $1.45\times$ stronger, so the case for the per-class decomposition is structural: only it gives each class a critical cost and a cascade. FRONT's apparent $122\times$ gap is inflated mainly by threshold exclusion rather than the inequality chain: on the active classes it is $21\times$, within $1.4\times$ of the $15\times$ measured undefended. Measuring the chain's two steps separately bounds the collapse onto one Lipschitz statistic below by $28\times$, against a divergence step measured at $1.5\times$. Undefended OVR distinguishability predicts post-defense per-class leakage at Spearman $\rho=0.62$--$0.77$, the transfer the certification procedure relies on. The framework carries over unchanged to a 100-class QUIC/TCP pair.
Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-09 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.06322 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-16T13:09:48.417Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-09?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).