Metraipolis › archive › dc_a159ab07e32f
Hierarchical Security Monitoring for Edge-IoT: A Formal Methods Approach — arXiv:2610.09817
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09817
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T11:44:32.371Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
65e65e521142d4392f20c31a23fa5f55541c2d303b5a21ea9d72768ee765c170- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a159ab07e32f
How to cite
Hierarchical Security Monitoring for Edge-IoT: A Formal Methods Approach — arXiv:2610.09817 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09817 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a159ab07e32f (Metraipolis archive dc_a159ab07e32f, sha256 65e65e521142d4392f20c31a23fa5f55541c2d303b5a21ea9d72768ee765c170)
BibTeX
@misc{dca159ab07e32f,
title = {Hierarchical Security Monitoring for Edge-IoT: A Formal Methods Approach — arXiv:2610.09817},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09817},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_a159ab07e32f; sha256 65e65e521142d4392f20c31a23fa5f55541c2d303b5a21ea9d72768ee765c170},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09817. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Cyber resiliency in edge-IoT deployments is fundamentally an economic problem: detection must keep critical processes operating under attack, but defender resources (compute, bandwidth, operator attention) are bounded. Centralised cloud monitoring offers expressive cross-device detection at prohibitive bandwidth cost; purely edge-local monitoring is cheap but blind to coordinated multi-device attacks where the asymmetric balance favours the attacker. We propose a lightweight hierarchical security-monitoring framework, built on formal runtime-verification methods, that occupies the practical middle ground at quantified cost. Each edge device runs a lightweight TeSSLa stream specification (size, payload validity, rate, and timestamp-drift predicates) that emits a four-valued verdict per aggregation window at sub-microsecond per-event cost; the gateway runs a parametric first-order MonPoly monitor over the per-device verdict streams at microsecond-scale per-verdict cost. The edge-to-gateway uplink carries roughly one Boolean per aggregation window per node, orders of magnitude smaller than the raw packet stream. The gateway tier detects coordinated attack patterns that no single-node monitor can see, shifting the asymmetric cost balance toward the defender. Every alert carries a witness set naming the device, the monitor tier, and the predicate that fired, providing an auditable record of the decision. We evaluate the framework on a container-host testbed spanning nominal and attacker nodes across four attack classes (buffer overflow, time spoofing, denial-of-service, and mixed advanced-persistent-threat patterns), and describe the edge- and gateway-tier specifications together with the cost-versus-coverage trade-off as monitor levels are added. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (elenco arXiv cs.CR, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Logic in Computer Science (cs.LO); Software Engineering (cs.SE). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.09817 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-08T10:45:22.456Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.CR/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).