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Fresh-Challenge VDF Attestations for Model-Relative Response Latency — arXiv:2609.12727
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12727
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T03:14:35.756Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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Fresh-Challenge VDF Attestations for Model-Relative Response Latency — arXiv:2609.12727 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12727 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9ff98893ca02 (Metraipolis archive dc_9ff98893ca02, sha256 810af389a5ec2ea17722758fae4f1ac010146a1f7b08b578b35a7aaa10e7be25)
BibTeX
@misc{dc9ff98893ca02,
title = {Fresh-Challenge VDF Attestations for Model-Relative Response Latency — arXiv:2609.12727},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12727},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9ff98893ca02; sha256 810af389a5ec2ea17722758fae4f1ac010146a1f7b08b578b35a7aaa10e7be25},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12727. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Can a finite verifier obtain public, model-relative evidence about response latency for sequential computation? Verifiable delay functions (VDFs) make this possible in principle: evaluation requires T sequential steps, whereas verification is efficient in the security parameter and polylogarithmic in the numerical value of T for standard constructions. Thus a delay can be astronomically large to evaluate yet succinctly represented and feasibly checked. A VDF proof for a chosen message alone is insufficient because it may be precomputed. We specify and analyze Fresh-Challenge VDF Attestations (FCLA), a protocol composition that binds a VDF to an unpredictable public challenge, a message, and independently auditable release and receipt records. Under explicit assumptions about VDF sequentiality, the challenge source, witness logs, and a calibrated upper bound on an adversary's sequential evaluation rate, an accepted FCLA transcript is inconsistent with post-challenge generation by an adversary in that bounded model. The result neither identifies a named claimant nor excludes relaying, outsourcing, or a faster unmodeled machine. A benchmark of the public reference implementation confirms the expected empirical separation between evaluation and verification on one documented machine. Our contribution is a protocol/design analysis and benchmarked reference implementation layer, not a new VDF construction or cryptographic primitive. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-14 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.12727 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T03:05:08.070Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-14?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).