Metraipolis › archive › dc_9fcd36f7c2eb
Why fragmented parliaments stop passing legislation: Opposition discipline and representation across four democratic institutions — arXiv:2608.24554
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24554
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-18T06:14:01.488Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
e01e10d5f0bd6d1b941a57a5ca026821ef49262128b640a6bcec33ae05ba9784- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9fcd36f7c2eb
How to cite
Why fragmented parliaments stop passing legislation: Opposition discipline and representation across four democratic institutions — arXiv:2608.24554 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24554 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9fcd36f7c2eb (Metraipolis archive dc_9fcd36f7c2eb, sha256 e01e10d5f0bd6d1b941a57a5ca026821ef49262128b640a6bcec33ae05ba9784)
BibTeX
@misc{dc9fcd36f7c2eb,
title = {Why fragmented parliaments stop passing legislation: Opposition discipline and representation across four democratic institutions — arXiv:2608.24554},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24554},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9fcd36f7c2eb; sha256 e01e10d5f0bd6d1b941a57a5ca026821ef49262128b640a6bcec33ae05ba9784},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24554. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Parliamentary systems pass more bills than presidential systems at baseline, but collapse to near-zero passage under party-system fragmentation. The literature offers three competing micro-explanations: coalition-formation failure, party discipline, and committee gatekeeping. These operate simultaneously in any real legislature, so observational studies struggle to separate their contributions. We present an agent-based model that compares four democratic institutions: pure parliamentary, pure republican/presidential, premier-presidential (France), and president-parliamentary (Russia). Across four scenarios and N=200 seeds per cell we report bootstrap confidence intervals, Morris screening, Sobol variance decomposition, mechanism ablations, and a hung-parliament variant comparison. Three findings emerge. First, government formation failure alone does not halt legislation: when a fragmented parliament reverts to personal voting, parliamentary passage (46.4%) is statistically indistinguishable from the presidential benchmark (44.8%); collapse requires cohesive opposition obstruction, which drives passage to 0.05%. Second, disabling discipline restores fragmented passage to 46.7%, and the rescue magnitude is monotone across the four institutions in a pattern that survives varying the common discipline level. Third, the passage-representation tradeoff is a single spectrum: parliamentary maximises throughput at the cost of representational fidelity; republican maximises fidelity via the presidential veto; semi-presidential variants split the difference. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-26 in cs.MA). Categorie arXiv: Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph) ; Multiagent Systems (cs.MA). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.24554 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-18T06:07:44.733Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.MA/2026-08-26?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).