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Asymmetric Rationality: Protocol Design and Behavioral Anomalies — arXiv:2510.23951

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.23951
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-31T06:22:26.122Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
1af190d6f63a88da04110212b55ce3c14ce9fe1f10f4dc6ed822e16f8703ec70
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9b87cdef8efa

How to cite

Asymmetric Rationality: Protocol Design and Behavioral Anomalies — arXiv:2510.23951 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.23951 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9b87cdef8efa (Metraipolis archive dc_9b87cdef8efa, sha256 1af190d6f63a88da04110212b55ce3c14ce9fe1f10f4dc6ed822e16f8703ec70)
BibTeX
@misc{dc9b87cdef8efa,
  title = {Asymmetric Rationality: Protocol Design and Behavioral Anomalies — arXiv:2510.23951},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.23951},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9b87cdef8efa; sha256 1af190d6f63a88da04110212b55ce3c14ce9fe1f10f4dc6ed822e16f8703ec70},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.23951. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We study how asymmetric rationality in strategic interactions can generate seemingly anomalous patterns of belief updating and behavior. A boundedly rational receiver designs a finite-state decision protocol to learn from a fully rational, privately informed, and biased sender who controls the flow of information. The receiver must allocate scarce memory between learning and incentive provision. We identify a simple class of protocols sufficient for optimal design and show how their structure generates information disengagement, indecision, and polarization. The receiver hesitates before deciding but becomes unresponsive to further evidence afterward. Identical receivers following the same protocol can reach opposing decisions despite receiving the same sequence of signals, with the probability of disagreement remaining bounded away from zero as their payoffs approach the optimum. These behaviors, which might otherwise appear erratic or psychologically driven, arise from the strategic use of limited memory.

Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (elenco arXiv cs.GT, nuovi lavori del giorno).
Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH) ; Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2510.23951 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-31T06:08:53.367Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.GT/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).