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The Delegation Dilemma: Economies of Scale, Accountability, and Polycentric Governance — arXiv:2610.21746
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21746
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-16T08:43:51.342Z
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The Delegation Dilemma: Economies of Scale, Accountability, and Polycentric Governance — arXiv:2610.21746 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21746 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9b81bb79c052 (Metraipolis archive dc_9b81bb79c052, sha256 a936c346d7fc661ee91de44f0bbf52dc9010e16a73638689fb00365ef429d4cf)
BibTeX
@misc{dc9b81bb79c052,
title = {The Delegation Dilemma: Economies of Scale, Accountability, and Polycentric Governance — arXiv:2610.21746},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21746},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9b81bb79c052; sha256 a936c346d7fc661ee91de44f0bbf52dc9010e16a73638689fb00365ef429d4cf},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21746. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Many collective-action systems are neither fully decentralized nor fully centralized: agents voluntarily organize into institutions that share organizational costs and delegate decisions to representatives. Delegation can reduce individual costs, but it also transfers control to representatives whose private objectives need not align with those of their constituents. We study this tension in a repeated game with endogenous delegation to self-interested centers. A simple reduced-form model yields a scale--accountability tradeoff: larger constituencies offer greater cost-sharing benefits to members, yet the marginal value to a center of retaining any one constituent decreases as group size grows. Consequently, the prospect of individual exit can sustain non-exploitative delegation only up to an endogenous accountable constituency size. Additionally, we identify parameter regions in which fully delegated, accountable governance, when feasible, must be polycentric. We investigate these predictions through simulations with large language model (LLM) agents. Across five matched pairs of 30-agent simulations, polycentric structures repeatedly emerge but remain fluid, exhibiting cycles of concentration, exploitation, exit, and re-formation. We further find that models of different capacity exhibit similar willingness to assume leadership but differ substantially in their exercise of authority, with Sol initiating exploitation more frequently than Luna in matched decision states. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.MA, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Multiagent Systems (cs.MA) ; Artificial Intelligence (cs.AI); Machine Learning (cs.LG). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.21746 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-16T08:43:47.644Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.MA/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).