Metraipolis › archive › dc_9aa958bbbb36
"What I See is What I Hear": Deepfake Detection Across Diverse Hearing Abilities — arXiv:2609.28659
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28659
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T04:53:17.297Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
7243052039ad82f10ee9c89036385ff3ab42b9008e137bacd1f242be15e01b8e- Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9aa958bbbb36
How to cite
"What I See is What I Hear": Deepfake Detection Across Diverse Hearing Abilities — arXiv:2609.28659 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28659 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9aa958bbbb36 (Metraipolis archive dc_9aa958bbbb36, sha256 7243052039ad82f10ee9c89036385ff3ab42b9008e137bacd1f242be15e01b8e)
BibTeX
@misc{dc9aa958bbbb36,
title = {"What I See is What I Hear": Deepfake Detection Across Diverse Hearing Abilities — arXiv:2609.28659},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28659},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9aa958bbbb36; sha256 7243052039ad82f10ee9c89036385ff3ab42b9008e137bacd1f242be15e01b8e},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28659. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
The proliferation of audiovisual deepfakes has lowered the cost of fraud, impersonation, and misinformation, but their success ultimately depends on human perception. Detection requires integrating auditory and visual cues, yet security and privacy research has largely overlooked d/Deaf and hard-of-hearing (DHH) populations. We address this gap with an in-person, mixed-methods study of 80 participants: 31 hearing persons (HPs), 15 hard-of-hearing (HoH) participants, 17 d/Deaf participants, and 17 cochlear implant (CI) users. Each participant judged the authenticity of 30 clips, where manipulations spanned text-to-speech, voice conversion, lip-sync, or face-swap. DHH participants were less accurate than HPs overall (76.4% vs. 88.0%, p<.001), primarily because they more often classified authentic clips as manipulated (FPR: 29.7% vs. 11.2%). Differences depended strongly on the manipulated channel. For audio-only manipulations, HoH participants matched HPs (90.0% vs. 90.3%), followed by CI users (79.4%) and d/Deaf participants (41.2%). When clips contained an audiovisual manipulation, accuracy clustered between 84% and 87%, although performance still varied by manipulation method. Our work systematically characterizes how deepfakes affect DHH populations, highlighting the asymmetric risks audiovisual manipulations may pose to groups with different hearing abilities and the need for accessible, tailored defenses that support all users. Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-25 in cs.CR). Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.28659 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-08T04:30:43.797Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-25?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).