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The Robustness of Sequential Implementation under Information Perturbations — arXiv:2609.30464
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30464
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-08T04:16:31.754Z
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The Robustness of Sequential Implementation under Information Perturbations — arXiv:2609.30464 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30464 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9936e3fbbe37 (Metraipolis archive dc_9936e3fbbe37, sha256 628a6591851ba3e71ae182b3b775074fa2c7ebfd93c2868b2cb20049573cfc3b)
BibTeX
@misc{dc9936e3fbbe37,
title = {The Robustness of Sequential Implementation under Information Perturbations — arXiv:2609.30464},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30464},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9936e3fbbe37; sha256 628a6591851ba3e71ae182b3b775074fa2c7ebfd93c2868b2cb20049573cfc3b},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30464. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Bayesian monotonicity is a necessary condition for full implementation in Bayes-Nash equilibrium. Under the sequential equilibrium refinement, however, multi-stage mechanisms can expand the scope for implementation. We show that this additional implementation power is fragile. Whenever a multi-stage mechanism sequentially implements a social choice correspondence that is not Bayesian monotone, we construct arbitrarily small "information perturbations'' and show that there are sequential equilibria under these perturbations that yield inadmissible decisions with probability bounded away from zero. Under these perturbations, players' types are not independent conditional on the state and some player is sometimes uncertain of their payoff type. We show by example that the general result fails if perturbations are required to satisfy conditional independence or "known payoff types.'' Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-28 in econ.TH). Categorie arXiv: Theoretical Economics (econ.TH). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.30464 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-08T03:49:20.362Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.TH/2026-09-28?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).