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On the Incompatibility of Weighted PROPX and Pareto Optimality for Indivisible Chores — arXiv:2608.16130
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- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16130
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-18T19:08:04.969Z
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On the Incompatibility of Weighted PROPX and Pareto Optimality for Indivisible Chores — arXiv:2608.16130 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16130 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_982bf6129079 (Metraipolis archive dc_982bf6129079, sha256 8df29bd3ca995f6655996a0898a67df85dcf4ae2429ca7cd1ced7cce8584272d)
BibTeX
@misc{dc982bf6129079,
title = {On the Incompatibility of Weighted PROPX and Pareto Optimality for Indivisible Chores — arXiv:2608.16130},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16130},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_982bf6129079; sha256 8df29bd3ca995f6655996a0898a67df85dcf4ae2429ca7cd1ced7cce8584272d},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16130. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Proportionality (PROP) is one of the simplest fairness criteria for allocating items among agents with additive preferences. With indivisible chores, however, PROP is not always satisfiable. We study proportionality up to any item (PROPX), which requires every agent to satisfy proportionality after any chore is removed from her bundle. Under strictly positive costs, we settle the weighted compatibility question negatively: weighted PROPX and Pareto optimality are incompatible already for two agents and four chores. Moreover, for every $n\geq3$, we give an $n$-agent, $(n+1)$-chore counterexample whose shares can be arbitrarily close to equal. These counterexamples are item-minimal: under strictly positive costs, weighted PROPX and Pareto optimality are always compatible when the number of chores is at most the number of agents, and they are compatible for two agents with at most three chores. Our impossibility result contrasts with the compatibility theorem of Mahara (2026) for weighted envy-freeness up to one item (EF1) and Pareto optimality . Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-18 in cs.GT). Categorie arXiv: Computer Science and Game Theory (cs.GT). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.16130 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-18T18:12:50.748Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.GT/2026-08-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).