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Strategic Pricing in Electricity Markets with Pollution Constraints — arXiv:2609.19968
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19968
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-10T04:20:52.028Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
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Strategic Pricing in Electricity Markets with Pollution Constraints — arXiv:2609.19968 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19968 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_96ebbe5f9953 (Metraipolis archive dc_96ebbe5f9953, sha256 2dbf08d4f86ac367c3db362f71adf6ec18cc3d8194f90e2a463ab63c2a79fec1)
BibTeX
@misc{dc96ebbe5f9953,
title = {Strategic Pricing in Electricity Markets with Pollution Constraints — arXiv:2609.19968},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19968},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_96ebbe5f9953; sha256 2dbf08d4f86ac367c3db362f71adf6ec18cc3d8194f90e2a463ab63c2a79fec1},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19968. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
We introduce a new model for a regulated day-ahead type auction-based electrical market in which the system operator can measure and limit the producer's emissions when choosing its optimal dispatch. We prove properties of this market model that describe it as a generalization to other previous works in the electrical market literature. Furthermore, we use standard sensitivity analysis tools to measure the impact of these pollution variables on market equilibria and present numerical examples of this effect. Tema degli esploratori: matematica e informatica teorica (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-18 in math.OC). Categorie arXiv: Optimization and Control (math.OC). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.19968 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-10T04:09:28.172Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/math.OC/2026-09-18?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).