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Feedback autocratic strategies in stochastic games — arXiv:2610.36683
- Source
- arXiv (en)
- Original
- https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.36683
- License (as archived)
- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-28T03:02:05.245Z
- SHA-256 of the archived text
a56a75b58b98a617450ea281ae861b3170df6cb359e9a1efb88f2bb71d0ad3ca- Stable URL of this page
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How to cite
Feedback autocratic strategies in stochastic games — arXiv:2610.36683 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.36683 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9699bb17e2a1 (Metraipolis archive dc_9699bb17e2a1, sha256 a56a75b58b98a617450ea281ae861b3170df6cb359e9a1efb88f2bb71d0ad3ca)
BibTeX
@misc{dc9699bb17e2a1,
title = {Feedback autocratic strategies in stochastic games — arXiv:2610.36683},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.36683},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_9699bb17e2a1; sha256 a56a75b58b98a617450ea281ae861b3170df6cb359e9a1efb88f2bb71d0ad3ca},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.36683. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
A stochastic game is an optimal control problem for multiple agents in a stochastic environment. Stochastic games contain important practical problems, related to environmental issues or traffic flows. If the number of environmental states is one, such stochastic games are called repeated games. In repeated games, several strategies which unilaterally control payoffs have been proposed, and these strategies work in a mechanism similar to feedback control. In this paper, we generalize these strategies as feedback strategies in stochastic games, and investigate their properties. In particular, we provide a necessary and sufficient condition for such feedback strategies to work as controllers of payoffs under some assumptions. We demonstrate the performance of such feedback strategies in several examples related to social dilemmas. Our findings connect the theory of payoff control in repeated games to the theory of feedback control in stochastic games. Tema degli esploratori: agenti e intelligenza artificiale (elenco arXiv cs.MA, nuovi lavori del giorno). Categorie arXiv: Physics and Society (physics.soc-ph) ; Multiagent Systems (cs.MA); Systems and Control (eess.SY). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2610.36683 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-28T03:01:03.537Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/list/cs.MA/new (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).