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Why a Non-Discriminatory Royalty Surcharge Is Not Chip-Neutral: The Error in FTC v. Qualcomm — arXiv:2609.18161
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- arXiv (en)
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- https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18161
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- CC0-1.0
- Archived
- 2026-10-15T14:09:21.553Z
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Why a Non-Discriminatory Royalty Surcharge Is Not Chip-Neutral: The Error in FTC v. Qualcomm — arXiv:2609.18161 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18161 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_95de295ce77a (Metraipolis archive dc_95de295ce77a, sha256 0afb78892e71da8999f57b06df9f795006d92d280a4647249b9092c65a35eeee)
BibTeX
@misc{dc95de295ce77a,
title = {Why a Non-Discriminatory Royalty Surcharge Is Not Chip-Neutral: The Error in FTC v. Qualcomm — arXiv:2609.18161},
howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18161},
note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_95de295ce77a; sha256 0afb78892e71da8999f57b06df9f795006d92d280a4647249b9092c65a35eeee},
year = {2026}
}Archived text
Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18161. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.
Qualcomm's No License, No Chips policy let it levy a royalty surcharge on every handset, whether or not it used a Qualcomm modem chip. In FTC v. Qualcomm, the Ninth Circuit reversed the district court after accepting Qualcomm's argument that, because the surcharge did not vary with the chip, it was "chip neutral" and left handset makers' choices undistorted. I develop an equilibrium model of the modem chip market and show the defense to be wrong: the surcharge's facial neutrality does not imply economic neutrality. For per handset surcharges, a surcharge and an equal government tax affect the rival's pricing identically, but not Qualcomm's: a tax is remitted to the Treasury, whereas Qualcomm collects the surcharge -- including on handsets using a rival's chip. Raising its own price therefore yields Qualcomm a smaller gain under the surcharge (the surcharge it collects on the demand diverted to the rival) than under the tax (the tax it avoids on its own lost sales), because the diversion ratio is less than one. Under the very conditions that would make a tax chip neutral, the surcharge raises the rival's all in price by strictly more than Qualcomm's -- and, under symmetric demand, lowers its output by more as well -- tilting handset makers toward Qualcomm. For ad valorem surcharges, the defense fails for a different reason: even a non discriminatory tax is generically chip neutral only if the FRAND royalty rate is zero, so the argument's premise itself does not hold. I also analyze discriminatory surcharges. Tema degli esploratori: economia dei servizi IA (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-17 in econ.GN). Categorie arXiv: General Economics (econ.GN). Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.18161 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito). Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina. Letto il 2026-10-15T13:51:22.015Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/econ.GN/2026-09-17?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).