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Full-Key Recovery and Forgery from One MQOM v2.1 Signature — arXiv:2608.09699

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09699
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-19T08:58:25.537Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
b4f1f84838b48807cf026e0e644c6f51b4976693aa73292b2cb7fdfe4cd3bb7f
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_950c53729359

How to cite

Full-Key Recovery and Forgery from One MQOM v2.1 Signature — arXiv:2608.09699 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09699 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_950c53729359 (Metraipolis archive dc_950c53729359, sha256 b4f1f84838b48807cf026e0e644c6f51b4976693aa73292b2cb7fdfe4cd3bb7f)
BibTeX
@misc{dc950c53729359,
  title = {Full-Key Recovery and Forgery from One MQOM v2.1 Signature — arXiv:2608.09699},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09699},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_950c53729359; sha256 b4f1f84838b48807cf026e0e644c6f51b4976693aa73292b2cb7fdfe4cd3bb7f},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09699. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

We give a full-key-recovery attack on MQOM v2.1, a Round-3 candidate in the NIST additional-signature process, that recovers the complete signing key from one accepted signature and uses it to sign a fresh message. If $\delta=\operatorname{FirstBits}_{\lambda}(x)$ is the prefix of the witness $x$, the sibling path determines a public value $A$ such that tree parity gives $s=\delta\oplus A$. Substitution into the hidden-leaf commitment yields $$\mathsf{Enc}_K(\delta\oplus A)=T\oplus\mathsf{LinOrtho}(\delta)$$ with public values $K$ and $T$. The correction in the same signature expands a solution into a complete witness, while the public MQ relation identifies those yielding valid signing keys; serializing such a witness gives the secret key, enabling a fresh-message signature accepted by the reference verifier. We evaluate this equation over the specified AES/Rijndael circuits using retained circuit state along a Gray traversal. Complete-domain scans for Categories I and V cost $2^{142.335112}$ and $2^{271.794162}$ Boolean gates. Category-III scans cover $1/2+2^{-20}$ and $0.580004770183$ of the domain at costs of $2^{206.774558}$ and $2^{206.988685}$ gates. All four totals are below the NIST security benchmarks. Reduced-domain runs against the reference implementation recover the byte-exact witness and key in all three categories and produce a fresh-message forgery accepted by the reference verifier. Independently generated source-syntax circuits evaluate the fixed ciphers over the stated domains and translated L3 prefixes, while an exact ideal-cipher factorial-moment bound controls additional equation preimages passed to public-key validation. Every value in the equation is fixed by the accepted transcript, so salt-bound global-root expansion changes its public constants without removing the one-signature recovery channel.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-08-11 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2608.09699 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-19T08:54:24.977Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-08-11?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).