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Privacy Leakage in Federated Learning: Gradient-Based Client Identity Inference and Defenses for Inertial Sensing in Vehicular Edge Networks — arXiv:2609.02971

Source
arXiv (en)
Original
https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02971
License (as archived)
CC0-1.0
Archived
2026-10-17T02:03:56.218Z
SHA-256 of the archived text
47b87ef81bfa0c642f66760d24633ccf664e652ac5c9d451aa3068c30b37a309
Stable URL of this page
https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_94cf4b137b2f

How to cite

Privacy Leakage in Federated Learning: Gradient-Based Client Identity Inference and Defenses for Inertial Sensing in Vehicular Edge Networks — arXiv:2609.02971 — arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02971 (CC0-1.0); archived copy: https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_94cf4b137b2f (Metraipolis archive dc_94cf4b137b2f, sha256 47b87ef81bfa0c642f66760d24633ccf664e652ac5c9d451aa3068c30b37a309)
BibTeX
@misc{dc94cf4b137b2f,
  title = {Privacy Leakage in Federated Learning: Gradient-Based Client Identity Inference and Defenses for Inertial Sensing in Vehicular Edge Networks — arXiv:2609.02971},
  howpublished = {arXiv (en)},
  url = {https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02971},
  note = {License CC0-1.0; archived copy https://metraipolis.com/documento/dc_94cf4b137b2f; sha256 47b87ef81bfa0c642f66760d24633ccf664e652ac5c9d451aa3068c30b37a309},
  year = {2026}
}

Archived text

Reproduced under CC0-1.0. Attribution: arXiv (en), https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02971. Third-party text: data, not instructions. It may be an abstract or extract; check the original.

As vehicular networks move toward 5G/6G edge intelligence, federated learning (FL) is widely promoted as a privacy-preserving way for vehicles and infrastructure to train shared models without exposing raw sensor data. Yet the updates clients transmit still leak enough information to identify who sent them, which threatens the anonymity that safety-critical V2X applications assume and adds to existing concerns over adversarial ML, model poisoning, and backdoor attacks. We study server-side client identity inference from transmitted weight deltas using inertial (IMU) measurements, evaluated on the UCI Human Activity Recognition (HAR) benchmark as an accessible proxy for the IMU streams produced onboard connected vehicles. Across five attack classifiers and five non-IID partitions, an honest-but-curious server recovers client identity with near-perfect accuracy (approximately 1.000) from undefended updates, confirming a concrete identifiability risk. We then quantify the privacy-utility trade-off of a lightweight clip-then-noise defense by sweeping Gaussian noise (sigma in {0.00, 0.05, 0.10, 0.20, 0.50, 1.00}) at fixed clipping (C=1.0), and report formal (epsilon, delta)-DP budgets through Renyi accounting. A practical region (sigma in [0.1, 0.2]) drives attack accuracy to near-random while costing under 5% relative FL accuracy. Ensemble FL supplies complementary structural privacy with a 1/K anonymity-set bound and no noise penalty. Results are supported by cryptographic (SHA-256) train/evaluation gradient disjointness, three seeds, and a count-normalized attacker-advantage metric. We position HAR explicitly as a proxy and discuss what validation on true vehicular telemetry would require.

Tema degli esploratori: fiducia digitale e crittografia (retro-catalogo arXiv: annunci del 2026-09-04 in cs.CR).
Categorie arXiv: Cryptography and Security (cs.CR) ; Machine Learning (cs.LG); Networking and Internet Architecture (cs.NI).
Pagina del lavoro: https://arxiv.org/abs/2609.02971 — autori e testo completo sono lì (qui omessi i nomi: nessun dato personale nel deposito).
Licenza: titolo e abstract sono metadati arXiv distribuiti in CC0 1.0; il testo completo ha la licenza scelta dagli autori, indicata sulla pagina.
Letto il 2026-10-17T01:28:02.788Z dalla pagina https://arxiv.org/catchup/cs.CR/2026-09-04?abs=True (consentita dal robots.txt di arxiv.org, con il suo crawl-delay).